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THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN 
NADAV SHOKED† 
ABSTRACT 
  Property is closely associated with freedom. Following the demise 
of the feudal property system, property ownership in Anglo-American 
law came to imply an individual’s freedom to act as she pleases on her 
land. For their part, modern property theories—whether right-based, 
utilitarian, or relational—employ the normative value of freedom to 
justify ownership. Courts and scholars have always acknowledged the 
fact that this freedom of the owner cannot be absolute: an owner’s 
freedom to do as she pleases on her land is often limited to protect 
other owners. However, the consensual assumption remains that an 
owner is not subject to affirmative duties. She is free, according to 
conventional wisdom, to choose to do nothing with her property. This 
Article argues that this assumption is simply wrong. Owners are not 
free to ignore their land. Property law has always subjected them to 
an obligation to maintain their land up to a specific standard. This 
obligation, dubbed here “the duty to maintain,” is enforced through 
an array of legal rules and practices. This Article chronicles these 
rules and practices for the first time, classifying them in accordance 
with the enforcement mechanism they employ. It then justifies these 
diverse rules and practices—and the general duty to maintain—in 
light of the different theories of property. In this fashion, this Article 
illustrates that ownership, both as a legal institution and as a 
normative concept, inherently and inevitably incorporates a duty to 
maintain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Property is freedom. Property ownership conveys on the owner 
independence, autonomy, and privacy; it cordons off a slice of the 
world and designates the owner as its master. Philosophers and 
economists, judges and laypeople, legal scholars and political 
scientists, varied as their ideological and methodological predilections 
may be, all ground property—even if to shifting degrees and for 
different reasons—in freedom.1 The rules of Anglo-American 
property law seemingly vindicate their position: once Jane becomes 
Blackacre’s owner, Jane is free to set the blueprint for Blackacre’s use 
and development.2 True, Jane’s freedom as an owner can never be 
absolute.3 There are activities that the law prohibits her from freely 
undertaking on Blackacre. She may be found liable if, for example, 
she constructs an artificial reservoir.4 She may be barred from 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 2. See infra Part I.A; see also SIMON GARDNER & EMILY MACKENZIE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW 181 (3d ed. 2012) (“[The] paradigm idea of ownership” is 
“dominium,” which “supposes that an owner has rights to do anything he likes with the ‘owned’ 
asset.”).  
 3. GARDNER & MACKENZIE, supra note 2, at 190–92. 
 4. Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
SHOKED IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2014  6:30 PM 
440 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:437 
establishing a factory.5 Moreover, the law may force Jane to allow 
others to enter, or stay in, Blackacre. She may, for example, be 
enjoined to permit patrons of all races to frequent the restaurant she 
operates on Blackacre.6 She may be ordered to share Blackacre with 
her former spouse.7 But in one very important respect Jane is still 
completely free as Blackacre’s owner. Jane may be banned from 
establishing a factory on Blackacre, but she cannot be forced to install 
one.8 Her desire to exclude diners of a specific racial group from her 
Blackacre restaurant may be thwarted, but she cannot be required to 
launch a restaurant.9 Legal writers view these freedoms as instances of 
a general freedom accorded to Jane: as Blackacre’s owner, she can 
simply decide to do nothing on, or with, Blackacre.10 In the eloquent 
terms employed by legal scholars, ownership incorporates a right to 
“let [the property] lie fallow,”11 or “gather dust.”12 
But does property ownership indeed encompass this right? 
At the time of this Article’s publication, properties are offered 
for sale in Detroit, Michigan, for one dollar.13 Assets languish on the 
 
 5. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388–90 (1926). 
 6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
 7. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34–23 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
 8. Cf. Vernon Park Realty Inc. v. Mt. Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519 (N.Y. 1954) (holding 
unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited an owner from using one specific property for any 
purpose but parking). 
 9. Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220–21 (1971) (approving decision to close pools 
rather than desegregate them). 
 10. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 5 (1997) (“[P]roperty is the right to 
determine how particular things will be used.”); Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case 
for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (2006) (“[O]wnership 
importantly encompasses the prerogative to use or not use the land as one pleases.”); A.M. 
Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 118 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) 
(arguing that the liberty to waste the thing owned is one of the incidents of “ownership”); 
Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 
YALE L.J. 1444, 1449–50 (2013) (“[O]wnership . . . is an office dedicated to a specific task—
setting the agenda for [the use of] a thing.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (2012) (“The first [prerogative of ownership] is the recognition . . . that 
the owner exercises residual managerial authority over the owned object.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939) 
(listing six rights as constituting ownership, among them four that incorporate the freedom to 
not use the property: the right to use, the right to enjoy its fruit, the right to destroy, and the 
right to injure the property).  
 11. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 62 (1995). 
 12. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 389 (2010). 
 13. For current listings, see Detroit Real Estate, REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/
realestateandhomes-search/Detroit_MI/type-single-family-home,condo-townhome-row-home-
co-op,multi-family-home/price-na-101/sby-1?pgsz=50 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).  
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market only if they are over-priced, implying that the fair market 
value of these specific properties is negative.14 If ownership includes 
the right to let property lie fallow or gather dust, this fact is baffling. 
To be valued at less than zero, the property must not only be 
valueless. It must do worse than offer no conceivable economic 
benefit.15 Negative-value property must carry actual duties for its 
owner. Yet the only involuntary affirmative duty acknowledged as 
affixed to ownership—the administrative duty to pay property 
taxes—cannot burden a valueless property: taxes are calculated as a 
percentage of the property’s value.16 The anomaly of the negative 
valuation of these Detroit properties can only be explained if 
nonadministrative duties inherent to ownership itself burden all 
property owners. That is, if ownership does not incorporate a right to 
“let [the property] lie fallow” or “gather dust.” 
This Article shows that ownership indeed does not include such a 
right. Rebutting scholars’ proclamations, this Article concludes that 
property law does not—and never did—afford the owner the freedom 
to do nothing with her land, and that furthermore, it should not afford 
that freedom to her. Rather, for weighty normative reasons, 
ownership contains an affirmative duty to keep land in good repair, a 
duty that forces owners to engage in certain activities on their land 
regardless of their own desires. This Article dubs this duty “the duty 
to maintain.” This duty to maintain is enforced through disparate 
legal means, ranging in the intensity of their impact. Sometimes, when 
the most extreme of these means are applied, the duty gives rise to a 
state of affairs in which property not only fails to equate with the 
owner’s freedom, but becomes freedom’s antithesis: ownership 
amounts to coercion. A property owner is less free than a nonowner. 
Jane may find herself subject to a legal duty she cannot shed as long 
 
 14. For an early report indicating the lengthy period such properties spend on the market, 
see Detroit Homes Still Selling for $1, THE DAILY CALLER, Nov. 1, 2012, http://dailycaller.com/
2012/11/01/detroit-homes-still-selling-for-1. 
 15. Certain properties in the distressed city of Detroit may indeed offer no conceivable 
economic benefit. Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection in July 2013. In re City of Detroit, 
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 4761053, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 16. MICH. CONST. art. IX § 3. The provision also mandates that property be re-assessed at 
the time of its transfer, thereby assuring the purchaser that she will not be charged property 
taxes based on an older, and outdated, appraisal of the land’s value. This result is highly unlikely 
regardless, as statutes provide for an annual reassessment of all properties. MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 211.10(1) (West 2005). Other government charges are assessed based on consumption. 
Though Detroit imposes a fixed fee for water and sewer services, an owner who is not leasing a 
residential unit can discontinue service. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE § 56-4-2 (2013).  
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as she owns Blackacre, while at the same time, she cannot rid herself 
of the legal status of owner.17 This is precisely the predicament 
trapping the owners of the Detroit one-dollar assets. 
How does law impose this liability on owners in Detroit and 
elsewhere? How does it render erroneous the prevalent academic 
perception that owners enjoy the freedom to let their property lie 
fallow or gather dust? What elements of law have academic writers 
been missing? Law imposes inescapable liabilities on owners through 
a myriad of rules. For example, an owner might be liable in tort law to 
trespassers injured on her land.18 An owner might be liable in 
nuisance law to neighbors if strangers use her property for illegal 
activities.19 An owner might be subject to a common-law duty to 
support adjoining lands.20 An owner might be bound to keep the 
property livable as long as a tenant occupies it, with limited rights to 
ever terminate that tenancy.21 An owner might be forced to buy 
unauthorized improvements to her land made by a stranger.22 
Although most of these rules are well established in law—indeed, 
many have existed in Anglo-American property law for centuries—
scholars have overlooked them in this context as they formally 
address disparate social ills that are unrelated to an owner’s right to 
let her land lie fallow or gather dust. These rules’ declared purposes 
are distinct and evince little intention to disturb an owner’s freedom 
of inaction: they are concerned, for example, with privileging 
possessors of land over landowners,23 remedying physical injuries,24 
combatting illegal activities,25 or shielding adjacent lands from 
 
 17. In American law land cannot be abandoned. E.g., Walker v. Polk, 44 So. 2d 477, 485 
(Miss. 1950) (en banc) (“[T]he common-law rule prevails that save as to easements, or licenses 
or mere equities, abandonment is not effective to divest the title to real estate . . . .” (quoting 
Meyerkort v. Warrington, 19 So. 2d 433, 435 (Miss. 1944))). 
 18. See infra Part II.A.  
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. Protections for improving trespassers against owners formally protect bona-fide 
unauthorized possessors. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1857–58 (2009).  
 24. Tort liability toward trespassers and others is meant to deter against, and compensate 
for, physical injuries. MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: ESSENTIALS 42–43 (2008). 
 25. Owners’ liability for illegal activities on their lands serves to lower crime rates. Kellner 
v. Cappellini, 516 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830–31 (Civ. Ct. 1986) (noting that “[t]he use of real property 
for illegal purposes such as the sale and use of illegal drugs if left unchecked will . . . increas[e] 
the crime rate in the area”).  
SHOKED IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN 443 
collapse.26 Therefore, never before have these rules been considered 
as forming part of one legal concept. Yet they all forcefully direct an 
owner toward one action: to maintain her property up to a specific, 
legally defined, standard. 
As this Article shows, there is an abundance of such rules.27 
Separately and in tandem, they create an affirmative duty inherent to 
property law; they establish this Article’s duty to maintain.28 By 
introducing this new unitary concept, this Article facilitates an 
informed and consistent assessment of the normative worth of each 
individual rule instituting a duty to maintain. Furthermore, through 
this exercise this Article promotes a new, and improved, 
understanding of the legal notion and social function of ownership. In 
influential works authored during and since the closing decade of the 
twentieth century, legal scholars have provided a richer and more 
accurate understanding of the rules and roles of property law.29 As 
Professor Joseph Singer clarified, property is not only about rights, 
but also about obligations.30 Much attention has accordingly been paid 
to obligations, such as those mentioned in the opening paragraph of 
this Introduction, that force an owner to refrain from certain activities 
 
 26. Owners must provide support to adjacent lands as every landowner holds the “right to 
have the soil in its natural condition supported.” 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND 
THOMAS EDITION § 69.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 1998). 
 27. In an upcoming Article, I will show that the duty extends beyond land ownership to 
water and mineral rights, personal property, and intellectual property. 
 28. Recent and influential articles deal with the owner’s right to destroy her property, Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005), and to abandon it, 
Strahilevitz, supra note 12; Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 191 (2010). They do not deal, however, with an owner’s freedom, or lack thereof, to 
neglect, which is this Article’s contribution. The duty to maintain is distinct from rights to 
destroy or abandon, because law treats the duty separately and it raises different (though 
sometimes related) normative concerns. See infra Part II.C.  
 29. Examples of this scholarship include GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: THE COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1997); 
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003); 
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003); Nestor M. Davidson, 
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Lee Anne 
Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001); Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of 
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897 (2007); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1691 (2012). 
 30. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16–18 
(2000). 
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on her land, or from excluding particular persons from entering it.31 
Yet to the very limited extent that property law’s affirmative 
obligations have been explored, scholars have either claimed that 
these obligations attach to the ownership of assets of exceptional 
social importance, such as heritage buildings32 or inns,33 or that they 
amount to mere aspiration in an era of environmental degradation.34 
This Article argues instead that property contains a general, 
persistent, ancient, and expanding affirmative duty to maintain an 
owned asset. The presence of such an intrusive obligation, in an 
institution supposedly dedicated to freedom, challenges our 
understanding of that institution. Ever since the dawn of the liberal 
age, thinkers have celebrated ownership as providing owners with 
freedom from the dictates of others. Accordingly they have 
condemned the attachment of affirmative obligations to ownership as 
smacking of feudal landholding notions, which conflated economic 
relations with personal obligations.35 The duty to maintain, as 
uncovered in this Article, unsettles this tenet of faith, for as this 
Article contends, property law’s duty to maintain is not the result of a 
series of historical mishaps or of defunct, feudal, legal reasoning. 
Rather, the duty flows directly from the different justifications for 
ownership that have animated property law’s concern with the 
institution since the inception of the modern age. 
The duty to maintain is normatively warranted, as it always 
represents an arrangement among property-interest holders. This 
arrangement can take one of three forms. First, some legal rules 
instituting the duty to maintain reflect an actual or implied 
arrangement between current or antecedent neighbors that was freely 
reached at some point, even though that point might only be found in 
the distant past.36 Second, a larger group of legal rules imposes the 
duty on neighbors as a legally constructed arrangement whereby they 
 
 31. See infra Part I.B.  
 32. E.g., David Lametti, The Concept of Property, 53 U. TORONTO L. J. 325, 354 (2003). 
 33. E.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1290–93 
(1996) (chronicling the special duties placed on innkeepers and common carriers, including 
heightened duties to protect their premises due to the premises’ public importance). 
 34. John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1986); 
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 15, 39–44 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998).  
 35. See infra Part I.C. 
 36. These rules include, for example, the laws respecting affirmative covenants and those 
respecting the maintenance of easements (such as rights of way). For a full discussion of these 
examples and all the other similar rules, see infra Part III.A. 
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all agree to maintain their lands, because collective-action problems 
block the neighbors themselves from attaining this mutually and 
socially beneficial arrangement.37 Third, a few legal rules insert the 
duty into existing arrangements whose terms create a relationship of 
dependence between property-interest holders whereby one unfairly 
exploits the other by not maintaining the land.38 Enforcement of each 
of these three incarnations of the maintenance obligation is inherent 
to the normative notion of ownership according to at least one of the 
three major property theories—right-based, utilitarian, or relational. 
Hence, the same normative theories that endorse property and 
celebrate the institution’s capacity to ensure freedom actually 
justify—nay, necessitate—the placement on owners of affirmative 
duties to maintain. 
The failure to coherently acknowledge this normative and 
doctrinal reality has carried tangible and troubling costs for American 
law. For example, in the aftermath of the housing market’s collapse in 
2008, states and localities moved to enforce vacant property 
maintenance codes against lenders who own mortgage interests in 
abandoned houses.39 When banks challenge such practices, courts 
often accept their arguments, believing that these new laws contradict 
traditional notions regarding a property-interest holder’s freedom to 
let her asset lie fallow or gather dust.40 In fact, however, these 
measures, geared toward remedying the devastating neighborhood 
and social costs of neglect and foreclosure, merely reincarnate 
entrenched principles of property law embodied in the duty to 
maintain. Moreover, they are wholly justifiable based on the duty’s 
normative standing. Judges ignore this fact due to a scholarly 
unawareness of the duty to maintain. This Article, demonstrating that 
the duty to maintain is and should be a component of property 
holding, ought to cure this oversight. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the concern of 
diverse property theories—grouped into three archetypes: right-
based, utilitarian, and relational—with freedom. It illustrates the key 
role attributed to freedom, that is, the owner’s liberty to act as she 
 
 37. These rules include, for example, an owner’s duties in negligence and nuisance, as well 
as the laws of adverse possession. For a full discussion of these examples and all the other 
similar rules, see infra Part III.B. 
 38. These rules are mostly those applicable in the landlord–tenant relationship. For a full 
discussion, see infra Part III.C. 
 39. See infra note 360.  
 40. See infra note 362.  
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pleases on her land, in justifying property. It then explores the nature 
of the limits the disparate property theories presently acknowledge as 
placed on such freedom. Part I finds that although theorists realize 
that an owner’s freedom to act as she pleases is never absolute, they 
mostly assume that in the postfeudal Anglo-American world, the 
owner enjoys a complete freedom to refrain from engaging in an 
activity on her land, unless she is subject to a specific contractual duty 
demanding otherwise. Part I concludes by demonstrating how this 
assumption has, over the past few years, affected the judicial 
approach to the imposition of duties on mortgage lenders. 
Part II then reveals that the assumption that the owner enjoys a 
freedom to refrain from action is misleading—that such a freedom 
does not exist even in current, postfeudal, property law. It presents 
the disparate legal rules that place on an owner a duty to maintain her 
land even if she herself never entered a contract to that effect. Part II 
offers a taxonomy of these rules based on the enforcement 
mechanism they employ, either financial liability or loss of land. It 
concludes by summarizing the standing in property law of the duty to 
maintain and its relationship to the owner’s right (or lack thereof) to 
abandon or destroy her property. 
Part III constructs explanations for the various rules exposed in 
Part II as forming property law’s duty to maintain. Three rationales 
for the duty to maintain are developed, drawing on each of the three 
property theories reviewed in Part I. Finally, to illustrate the practical 
implications of its theoretical findings, Part III concludes by revisiting 
the debate over lenders’ duties in foreclosure, introduced earlier in 
Part I. 
I.  CURRENT PROPERTY THEORY: OWNERSHIP AS FREEDOM FROM 
DUTIES TO ACT 
A. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Property Theories 
This Article’s main contribution is highlighting and explaining 
the freedom-depriving function of property. To grasp the challenge to 
common scholarly thinking this contribution portends, it is necessary 
to first appreciate the central role legal and philosophical theories 
attach to freedom in constructing the notion of property. Thus, this 
opening Part surveys the different ways in which all major property 
theories celebrate the owner’s freedom on her land, and more 
prominently, the owner’s immunity from others’ commands to act on 
her land. The major property theories are grouped into three 
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archetypes: right-based, utilitarian, and relational. This Part briefly 
surveys each archetype and the manner in which it grounds property 
in the owner’s freedom. 
1. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Right-Based Property 
Theories.  Right-based arguments constitute the first archetype of 
property theories. A right-based property theory takes an individual’s 
interest as sufficient moral justification for holding others under a 
duty to respect private property.41 The particular individual interest 
that can justify property differs across right-based justifications for 
property. But the owner’s freedom is central to all—whether they are 
Kantian, libertarian, Lockean, or Hegelian. Kantian and libertarian 
accounts are the most extreme in this regard. According to Kant, the 
establishment of the legal institution of property is rooted in the 
innate right to freedom.42 Kant defines freedom as “independence 
from being constrained by another’s choice.”43 Freedom is the 
requirement that no other person be able to tell an individual what 
purposes to pursue.44 To effectuate this innate capacity for choice 
immune from the interference of others, external objects of choice 
must be accessible to the individual.45 Therefore, each person must 
have an entitlement to external objects: a right rendering an object 
available for the exclusive exercise of her capacity for choice.46 In 
other words, holding an asset, whose manner of use cannot be 
dictated to the individual by others, is a prerequisite for the 
individual’s freedom. 
Libertarian theories rely heavily on this argument, eventually 
equating property with freedom. In libertarianism the private-
property regime is justified as the only regime that both sustains and 
is sustained by the owner’s free actions.47 Property presents the most 
effective constraint on the ability of outsiders—most notably, the 
government—to interfere with individual freedom.48 By dispersing the 
 
 41. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 87 (1988). 
 42. Ernest Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 795, 801 (2003). 
 43. IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 353, 393 (Cambridge ed. 1996).  
 44. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 14, 34 (2009). 
 45. KANT, supra note 43, at 419.  
 46. Weinrib, supra note 42, at 806. 
 47. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM xiii (1999) (arguing that 
liberty is “inconceivable” without property). 
 48. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 59.  
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ability to freely act on resources among many owners, the private-
property regime prevents one decisionmaker from monopolizing 
power.49 Conversely, an interference with the individual owner’s 
freedom—forcing her to use her property in a certain manner—
amounts to exacting forced labor from her.50 This leads libertarians to 
demand full respect of the owner’s autonomy to do, or not do, as she 
pleases with her property. 
Though other right-based property theories do not ground 
property primarily in freedom, and are often able to steer clear of 
libertarian conclusions, they too hold that ownership serves values of 
autonomy and self-determination. Locke’s highly influential right-
based theory locates ownership’s source in labor.51 Subject to certain 
provisos, it awards ownership to the person who labored on the 
resource.52 After property is acquired in this fashion, Locke’s theory 
stresses the owner’s freedom to act on the land that is now hers. 
Through labor, the individual gains absolute control over the asset 
“that another can no longer have any right to,”53 and from which “the 
common right of other Men” is excluded.54 Mixing one’s labor with an 
external object results in the freedom to decide whether to act, or not 
act, on the object. 
Similar to the Lockean labor theory, Hegelian property theories 
do not ground property in freedom per se.55 Rather, they associate 
property with the individual’s personality or personhood.56 Yet, like 
all other right-based property theories, they too eventually insist on 
the owner’s isolation from the decrees of others. For Hegelians, the 
person can become a real self only through relationships with external 
objects.57 Individuals “need to be able to ‘embody’ the freedom of 
 
 49. RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 139 (1998).  
 50. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167–72 (1974). 
 51. On Locke’s impact in America, see generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION 
IN AMERICA (1955).  
 52. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
University Press 1988) (1690).  
 53. Id. § 26. 
 54. Id. § 27. 
 55. On Hegelian theories and their contemporary relevance, see generally Margaret Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).  
 56. Hegel’s ideas thus differ from Kant’s. See Alan Brudner, Private Law and Kantian 
Right, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 279, 310–11 (2011) (observing that the Hegelian system is distinct 
from the Kantian system, as Kant theorized that “private rights to external things are 
provisional and displaceable by public right—that all conclusive right is public right”).  
 57. G. W. F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44, at 155 (S.W. Dyde trans. 1896). 
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their personalities in external objects so that their conceptions of 
themselves as persons . . . become concrete and recognizable . . . in a 
public and external world.”58 Because the external object embodies 
the individual’s personality or free will, the individual should have the 
right to control that external object. Interferences with the owner’s 
relationship with, or decisions respecting, her external objects are a 
denial of the owner’s personhood. For personhood theories, as for the 
freedom-based Kantian property theories, property crystalizes into 
the “first embodiment of freedom.”59 
2. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Utilitarian Property 
Theories.  For different reasons, all right-based property theories 
highlight property’s function in enabling individual freedom and in 
barring outsiders from dictating a course of action to the individual 
owner. Utilitarian justifications for property, which represent the 
second archetype of property theories, likewise celebrate property’s 
capacity to promote freedom. 
Utilitarian theories are not interested in freedom as a right. 
Indeed, the distinction between right-based and utilitarian theories is 
the latter’s refusal to recognize a single individual aim—say, 
freedom—as a basis for moral constraints.60 Rather, in the utilitarian 
worldview, the foundation for an institution must be its capacity to 
serve a social aim. In the most prevalent of current utilitarian 
theories, that aim is overall social wealth or general welfare.61 This 
aim is promoted, according to utilitarian commentators, when law 
grants owners the freedom to act.62 As a result, although not invested 
in freedom qua freedom, that is, in freedom’s inherent moral value, 
utilitarian accounts of property still embrace property specifically due 
to its freedom-promoting function. 
Owners’ freedom to make independent decisions regarding the 
use and transfer of assets is vital for general welfare because it assures 
that assets are used in a socially efficient manner. The private-
property regime promises an owner that she will reap the fruits of any 
 
 58. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 353.  
 59. Id. § 45 note; see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 58 (2012) (“Hegel’s theory shares with libertarian 
accounts of property a fundamental concern with promoting individual freedom.”).  
 60. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 79. 
 61. E.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–12 (3d ed. 1986). 
 62. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 59, at 11–34 (providing an overview of 
these commentators’ positions).  
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positive developments of her land and bear the burdens of negative 
developments; thereby the regime affords her a strong incentive to 
choose for her land only uses whose benefits outweigh their costs.63 
Thus, as Professor Harold Demsetz argues in a seminal article, the 
point of private property is that it aligns the owner’s incentives in the 
utilization of her land with the social interests regarding its use. 
Private property is the optimal solution for the societal challenge of 
making efficient use of society’s limited resources.64 
A regime relying on the owner’s freedom is socially 
advantageous not only because the owner holds the strongest 
incentive to reach the most efficient decisions regarding the asset, but 
also because no one else has better knowledge respecting an asset’s 
best use.65 The owner, as the person closest to the asset, is the person 
most familiar with it; additionally, and inevitably, she knows best 
which uses will promote her own welfare as an individual.66 
Utilitarians, accordingly, argue that an asset’s true social value can 
only be discerned through market transactions whereby independent 
owners freely express their preferences respecting the asset.67 The free 
market is capable of rectifying the situation when the current owner 
does not place the highest subjective value on, or is not the best user 
of, the asset. Such an owner will be furnished with pecuniary 
incentives to identify and contract with another individual who places 
a higher value on the asset.68 Thus, through a utilitarian analysis, the 
owner’s freedom to independently adopt decisions governing the use 
and transfer of land renders private property the optimal regime for 
resource regulation. 
3. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Relational Property 
Theories.  The legal academic accounts forming the third archetype of 
 
 63. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) 
(describing this regime). 
 64. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 
(1967). 
 65. Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754–55 (2004). 
 66. Most current utilitarian theories define social welfare as the maximum satisfaction of 
individual subjective preferences. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: 
Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 982 
(2001). 
 67. Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in 
COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING: CRITICAL STUDIES ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIALISM 
87, 97 (F. Hayek ed. 1935) (1920). 
 68. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–20 (2004).  
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property theories combine elements from the right-based and 
utilitarian theories to synthesize a description of the function of 
property that differs from that drawn by those two groups of theories. 
Nonetheless, like right-based and utilitarian theories, this last group 
of theories celebrates ownership’s role as provider of freedom. The 
theories considered in this Section under the collective heading 
“relational” have gained in popularity over the past two decades. 
Amongst them, I count theories titled civic-republican,69 
Aristotelian,70 objective-wellbeing,71 human-flourishing,72 pluralist,73 
social-relations,74 social-obligation,75 and progressive-property.76 Like 
right-based theories, these theories all cherish specific values. Yet, 
unlike right-based theories whose focus is on individual rights, 
relational theories share with utilitarianism the belief that property is 
justified because it promotes social goals. Unlike utilitarianism, 
however, these theories have a preset view of what those social goals, 
or values, are. They do not define social goals in terms of overall 
welfare (that is, satisfying subjective preferences),77 but rather ground 
them in a specific objective view of the common good and of 
desirable social interactions. 
More often than not, freedom is one of the defining elements of 
these desirable interactions, and property is heralded as its 
paramount purveyor.78 This attitude is associated with the most 
influential relational-property theory in American thinking—civic 
republicanism. Civic republicanism locates property’s justification in 
 
 69. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1335–36 
(1991).  
 70. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–65 (2009). 
 71. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of 
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1669 (2003). 
 72. Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2011). 
 73. Davidson, supra note 29, at 1600; Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of 
Waste Law, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654–58 (2006). 
 74. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 741, 742 (1986). 
 75. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 745 (2009). 
 76. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. 
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009). 
 77. For utilitarians, welfare includes everything that an individual might value. LOUIS 
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18 (2006). 
 78. E.g., Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1237, 1237 (2005). 
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its democratic role. A tradition hearkening back to canonical thinkers 
such as Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson, it posits that property-
holding is a prerequisite for meaningful citizen participation in 
government.79 To be an active citizen, freely participating in the 
political realm, the individual must not depend on others.80 As long as 
others control her economic wellbeing, an individual cannot be 
expected to be free from their will when politically participating. 
Jefferson, therefore, extolled the independent yeoman living on his 
own land. In Jefferson’s mind, and in that of his disciples, the 
persistence of republican governance hinges on widespread property-
ownership because ownership assures the freedom to independently 
make decisions regarding one’s life, interests, land, and politics.81 
Similar support for wide ownership-distribution is proclaimed by 
the other theories listed above as relational, although their focus is 
not limited to ownership’s political function.82 These other relational 
theories suggest that society entertains a substantive conception of 
the good life. As a society, we believe that certain things are good for 
people and that having such things makes for better lives.83 
Prominently, and in clear departure from the Jeffersonian fixation on 
the detached yeoman, non-civic republican relational theories count 
relationships with others among those things individuals must have in 
order to flourish.84 
The ensuing reverence for property law’s power to foster 
relationships—rather than isolation—renders relational theories 
hospitable to limitations on the powers of owners. Nonetheless, 
relational theorists contend that the relationships humans must 
maintain if they are to flourish have to be based on a great degree of 
freedom. The objective values necessary for a good life include deep 
social relations, but also autonomy and liberty, which imply an ability 
to choose one’s life course. Such choices are possible only through 
 
 79. On Aristotle’s political theory, see RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE 359–64 (2002); on 
Jefferson’s view of property, see ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 26–42. For a modern theory of 
property based on republicanism, see Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the 
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1325 (1987). 
 80. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIX (1785). 
 81. DANIEL HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 
1815-1848, at 489 (2007). 
 82. E.g., SINGER, supra note 30, at 144; Alexander, supra note 75, at 768. 
 83. E.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 71, at 1701–14; Peñalver, supra note 70, at 864. 
 84. E.g., Alexander, supra note 75, at 765–73. 
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independent control of some material goods.85 Individuals cannot 
pursue the lives they desire or freely enter relationships that enable 
them to flourish if they lack unilateral control over some assets.86 
Property law must afford them such control. For law to promote 
wellbeing and sustain vital relationships, it must assure an ample 
measure of freedom and autonomy to a widespread population of 
property holders. 
B. Limitations on an Owner’s Freedom in Current Property Theories 
As the preceding exposition concluded, all property theories 
attribute to ownership the salutary function of furthering freedom. 
Accordingly, property law’s doctrines have been structured toward 
the promotion of the owner’s autonomy.87 Yet, in a world of limited 
resources, in which owners are surrounded by other owners, there is 
no possible way to secure for all owners the capacity to freely do as 
they wish with their property. If one owner is free, for example, to 
construct a reservoir that floods underground shafts connecting her 
land with another’s, the second owner is not free to operate a mine on 
her land.88 If red cedar trees communicate a disease to apple trees, 
owners are not free to plant apple trees if their neighbor is free to 
plant red cedars.89 If all local owners are free to enforce an 
agreement—a “covenant”—barring themselves and their successors 
from conveying their properties to “people of the Negro or 
Mongolian race,” African Americans can never freely become 
owners.90 Property rights conflict; one owner’s freedom of action 
inevitably interferes with another’s. As a result it is clear that all three 
property theories admit and even require limits on the owner’s 
freedom; uncertainty solely surrounds the location of those limits.91 
Each theory places the limits in accordance with its own particular 
normative standards for defining and designing property rights. 
 
 85. Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 51, 65, 67 (1998). 
 86. SINGER, supra note 30, at 15.  
 87. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1728–31 (1976). 
 88. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 89. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (holding that the state was within its 
power to choose the destruction of one class of property to save another). 
 90. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1948) (addressing a covenant restricting 
property ownership based on race). 
 91. SINGER, supra note 30, at 16. 
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Right-based property theories ground property in individual 
rights, such as freedom. Yet they only recognize a right as long as its 
exercise does not harm the rights of others.92 Thus, right-based 
arguments must discern what counts as harm—or, more precisely, 
illegitimate harm—and then limit the owner’s right when her freedom 
of action engenders such harm. Utilitarian arguments embrace the 
owner’s freedom because, thanks to the owner’s right to the asset, her 
private interests align with social interests concerning its use. But 
when those interests do not correspond—when the owner’s freedom 
of action produces effects felt only by others—the owner’s freedom of 
action does not promote social welfare. The task for utilitarians is to 
identify such externalities that cannot be internalized by the owner 
through bargaining with others and limit her freedom of action to 
avert them.93 Relational explanations hold that individual freedom 
assured through ownership is necessary for human flourishing. But 
they realize that beyond a certain point, a commitment to an owner’s 
individual freedom either defeats shared relationships that are also 
necessary for flourishing or interferes with the ability of others to 
acquire minimal resources for flourishing.94 Ascertaining the correct 
mixture between these interests needed for flourishing, and limiting 
an owner’s freedom in accordance, is the challenge for relational 
theorists. 
The diverse balancing acts required by the different theories—
right-based, utilitarian, and relational—are executed through 
property law’s specific doctrines. Relying on right-based, utilitarian, 
or relational theories, a court might employ nuisance law to conclude 
that the owner’s freedom to construct the reservoir should be 
curtailed to protect her neighboring owner’s freedom.95 Relying on 
right-based, utilitarian, or relational theories, a legislature might avail 
itself of the police power to conclude that owners’ freedom to grow 
red cedars should be curtailed to protect other owners’ freedom.96 
 
 92. E.g., The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen art. 4 (1789) (“Liberty 
consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.”), reprinted in HUMAN 
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744, 744 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987); JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 93 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (“The individual is not accountable to society for 
his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself.”). 
 93. Lee Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1503 (2013). 
For a detailed discussion on the role of externalities in utilitarian property theories, see infra 
Part III.B. 
 94. SINGER, supra note 30, at 12. 
 95. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339. (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 96. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1927) (quoting VA. CODE §§ 885–893 (1924)). 
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Relying on right-based, utilitarian, or relational theories, a court or 
legislature may reform the law of covenants to curtail owners’ 
freedom to enforce racially restrictive covenants, in order to protect 
others’ freedom.97 As these examples illustrate, to serve all or any of 
the goals theorists ascribe to property, law limits owners’ freedom in 
many ways. The checks scholars usually recognize as placed on 
owners’ freedom fall into one of the following categories:98 limits on 
what the owner can do with her property, limits on the owner’s 
freedom to exclude, limits on the owner’s ability to determine who 
will own the property in the future, lack of immunity against having 
the property taken by the government, and regulations of 
relationships among the owner and the owners of other interests in 
the property. 
Most—perhaps all—of these checks on ownership heretofore 
appreciated by legal academic writers are negative in nature. They 
limit what the owner can do with her land, but they do not force her 
to actually do something with it.99 As Anthony Honoré explains in his 
famed exploration of the institution of ownership, the acknowledged 
“social aspect” of ownership is not truly affirmative. “Positive control 
by the state shades into prohibition. The positive duty to exploit one’s 
property in a socially beneficial way, as opposed to the prohibition of 
a harmful exploitation, has not been generally imposed or its 
implications fully worked out.”100 This accepted legal wisdom 
engenders claims that ownership includes the right to let land lie 
fallow or gather dust.101 In light of the disparate property theories this 
Part reviewed, this state of affairs is wholly justified. Property is 
promulgated to advance freedom, solely or among other values. 
Although absolute freedom is unattainable in a society in which every 
owner is located in proximity to other owners and is able to control 
others’ access to ownership, the complete negation of owners’ 
freedom—the coercion of owners into action—appears inappropriate. 
 
 97. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that court enforcement of 
restrictive covenants is an exercise of police power); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
 98. Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641–43 (1988). 
 99. An exception might be found in an article by Larissa Katz in which she describes 
ownership as an “office” through which the state presses owners into its service, assigning them 
burdens. See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Property Rights 
Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2035 (2012). Still, the only affirmative burden 
discussed in Katz’s work is the owner’s statutory obligation in many cities to shovel snow from 
the adjoining sidewalk.  
 100. Honoré, supra note 10, at 146.  
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
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C. Owners’ Affirmative Duties in Anglo-American Law: From Status 
to Contract 
In view of these current understandings of ownership, rules were 
supposedly adopted in Anglo-American property law to free owners 
from the specter of affirmative obligations.102 Professor James Harris’s 
important work on the concept of property in law concludes that 
“property-duty . . . rules . . . play an insignificant role in modern 
. . . institutions.”103 Property-duty rules “constitute an eccentric 
anachronism in the modern world.”104 The reason, Harris explains, is 
that such duties are characteristic of feudal property institutions.105 
Much of the attachment professed by modern thinkers of all three 
property theories to the owner’s freedom, as depicted in this Part, 
stems from their reaction to feudalism.106 The feudal social system 
contradicts modern ideas of individual rights, efficient free markets, 
and human flourishing. Feudalism was a system in which the King 
allocated land to lords in exchange for services, such as loyalty and 
raising armies and goods. In turn, lords allocated rights in the land to 
those below them on the hierarchical ladder, again in exchange for 
services, including labor on lands held by the lord, or coming to his 
aid when called.107 In such a legal order, in which property relations 
embodied personal relations taking place in a society defined by 
inequality, obligation, and static positions, a duty placed on the 
landholder to actively engage in specific behaviors on his land—to 
employ it for certain purposes, to put it to productive use, to maintain 
it—was completely coherent with the system’s principles. After all, 
the whole estates system was founded on this idea of affirmative 
obligations owed by a land’s holder.108 
But with the dawn of the liberal age, the feudal social order was 
condemned and eventually overthrown. The feudal conception of 
property fell out of fashion: law came to prohibit feudal landholding, 
 
 102. JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY 635–36 (3d ed. 2010). An example is the rule against 
perpetuities, which frees certain interest holders from affirmative (as well as negative) 
obligations attached to their interest by a predecessor. The rule against restraints on alienation 
often performs a similar function.  
 103. J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 37 (2002).  
 104. Id. at 34. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 292–93 (1998). 
 107. For more on the feudal system, see generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE 
LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986). 
 108. Cribbet, supra note 34, at 39. 
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mandating instead that all land titles be “allodial.”109 Allodial 
property was defined as “free; not holden of any lord or superior; 
owned without obligation or vassalage or fealty; the opposite of 
feudal.”110 As the great legal historian Henry Maine famously put it, 
law progressed “from [s]tatus to [c]ontract.”111 Feudal property 
holding was a status ineluctably and immutably carrying duties of 
loyalty, obligation, and service toward others; modern, allodial, 
property holding is supposed to entail no similar duties. 
If duties to act are to be recognized and enforced against an 
owner, the owner must freely elect and design them. In other words, 
affirmative duties can be placed on ownership only through 
contract—not through the mere status of ownership. For example, 
Jane, Blackacre’s owner, can promise another person that she will 
produce something on Blackacre or preserve its appearance. She can 
enter a contract with the Department of Agriculture whereby she 
promises to take actions to conserve the soil.112 If Jane leases, rather 
than owns, Blackacre, her lease might require her to not let it lie 
fallow and to “cultivate the premises . . . in a farmerlike manner and 
according to the usual course of farming practiced in the 
neighborhood.”113 In contrast, as the eminent jurist William 
Blackstone explained, if she “be the [holder of the] absolute . . . fee-
simple . . . [s]he may commit whatever waste [her] own indiscretion 
may prompt [her] to, without being impeachable or accountable for it 
to anyone.”114 As a result, “though the waste is undoubtedly damnum, 
it is damnum abseque injuria [a moral wrong without legal redress].”115 
This “waste” will only become a wrong with legal redress if, as in 
the examples of the contract with the Department of Agriculture or 
the lease, Jane herself consented to refrain from committing it. The 
obligation in these cases arises from Jane’s agreement, rather than 
from her status as the land’s holder. It is personal to her. Jane the 
 
 109. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 28; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 14; Wallace v. 
Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492, 501 (1863) (holding that all property in Pennsylvania is allodial “purged 
of all the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting only the feudal names of things not any longer 
feudal”). 
 110. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76  (6th ed. 1990).  
 111. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 179 (3d ed., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1866) 
(emphasis omitted).  
 112. 30 U.S.C. § 1236(a) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to enter such 
agreements). 
 113. Coats v. Stephens, 67 Cal. App. 753, 754 (Ct. App. 1924). 
 114. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 223–24.  
 115. Id. at 224 (emphasis omitted). 
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person, not Jane Blackacre’s owner, may, by her own choosing, 
become obliged to produce something on Blackacre or to conserve its 
appearance.116 
Duties to act on the land that are embedded in ownership, 
independent of any contract, are supposedly alien to modern, 
postfeudal property law. Even writers that lament this development 
acknowledge it. “The disappearance of any long established social 
system must involve some losses. And so, in the case of feudalism it is 
regrettable that there could not have been preserved the idea that all 
property was held subject to the performance of duties . . . .”117 Or 
“nothing in American law resembles a sustained account of a . . . 
norm predicated on the idea that private ownership entails 
obligations to act.”118 
D. The Policy Effect of Current Property Theory’s Attitude Toward 
Affirmative Duties: The Debate over Lenders’ Responsibilities 
These prevalent accounts, observing that modern American 
property law has repudiated all affirmative duties not created by the 
owner herself, exert influence on the development of current laws. 
The trope that in the modern legal system the owner can let her 
property lie fallow or gather dust echoes, as just seen, historical 
concerns and normative values associated with property. It therefore 
easily impacts judicial attitudes toward property law. The trope’s 
resulting impact has been to decrease the law’s ability to confront 
new challenges.119 
A striking example is the legal backlash against the response of 
states and local governments to the housing-market crash of 2008.120 
 
 116. Thus, for example, the statute limits soil conservation agreements to ten years, and the 
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture must determine that the party will control the land 
for the duration. 30 U.S.C. § 1236(a) (2012). 
 117. Francis Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 710 
(1938).  
 118. Alexander, supra note 75, at 757.  
 119. I am grateful to Laura Underkuffler for encouraging me to think of the problem in 
these terms. 
 120. In the late 2000s, a major recession hit the American and then the global markets. 
According to the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession in the United 
States began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
US BUSINESS CYCLES AND CONTRACTIONS (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/
cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20120423.pdf. Most of the American 
public associates the starting point of the recession with the fall of Lehman Brothers investment 
bank in September 2008, especially because a major cause of the recession was the subprime 
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In the aftermath of the market’s collapse, many urban and suburban 
neighborhoods were dotted with neglected properties, whose owners 
were, more often than not, long gone.121 As both policy-makers and 
researchers believe that such properties are extremely detrimental to 
their surroundings,122 cities and states throughout the nation have 
been devising means to tackle the problem presented by properties 
whose owners defaulted on their mortgages. A particularly appealing 
strategy has been to target mortgagees—the banks who hold liens 
over these neglected or vacant properties. New or revised state and 
local laws render lending institutions liable for the upkeep of vacant 
houses and lots after the owner defaults on the mortgage.123  
Laws and ordinances differ with respect to the specific 
obligations they institute.124 The exact moment at which the lien 
holder becomes responsible for these obligations also varies across 
jurisdictions. For example, some impose liability on the lender 
immediately upon the owner’s default on the loan.125 Others tie 
liability to the initiation of the foreclosure proceedings,126 and still 
others to the assumption of possession of the property by the lender 
during those proceedings.127 Elsewhere, the obligation applies 
 
mortgage market. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 59 
(describing the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy as the beginning of the recession). 
 121. See, e.g., DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD HAS A 
FUTURE . . . AND IT DOESN’T INCLUDE BLIGHT (May 2014) (report of the task force appointed 
by the President regarding the extent and effect of neglected houses in Detroit).  
 122. Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4.5 (West 2009) (“Vacant, deteriorated structures 
contribute to blight, cause a decrease in property values, and discourage neighbors from making 
improvements to properties. . . . Structures that remain boarded up for an extended period of 
time also exert a blighting influence and contribute to the decline of the neighborhood by 
decreasing property values, discouraging persons from moving into the neighborhood, and 
encouraging persons to move out of the neighborhood.”). See infra notes 353–60 and 
accompanying text.  
 123. The consumer credit industry’s national trade association reports that as of April 17, 
2014, 684 cities had enacted such ordinances. Such cities can be found in all but a handful of 
states (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawai’i, Montana, North Dakota). AM. FIN. SERV. ASS’N, 
VACANT, ABANDONED, AND FORECLOSED PROPERTY: MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES (2014). 
 124. For examples of such local maintenance code obligations, see infra notes 272–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 125. E.g., CHULA VISTA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.60.040 (2014); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-
12-126 (holding a mortgagee liable within the later of thirty days after the building becomes 
vacant or sixty days after a default). 
 126. E.g., BOS., MA., ORDINANCE § 16-52.3 (applying an obligation seven days after 
“initiation of the foreclosure”); MADISON, WIS. GEN. ORDINANCE § 27.10 (applying obligations 
thirty days following the initiation of foreclosure proceedings). 
 127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-15-401 (2014). 
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following the issuance of a foreclosure judgment.128 Another 
jurisdiction introduces it upon conclusion of the bidding process at 
the foreclosure sale.129 Finally, the duty may come into effect later 
still, once the foreclosure sale is completed.130 Though they thereby 
differ in their details, these laws all subject lenders to upkeep 
requirements. Minnesota adopted a measure that is even more 
innovative. The pertinent state statute empowers local governments 
to expedite the foreclosure process by demanding that the court 
shorten the mortgagor’s redemption period and thereby force lenders 
or buyers at a foreclosure sale to assume ownership of abandoned 
residential properties.131 
These efforts to expand lenders’ liability for the upkeep of 
properties met with stern resistance from lenders,132 and courts were 
often persuaded by these lenders’ arguments.133 Successful legal 
 
 128. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney Supp. 2014) (applying 
maintenance obligations to lenders after judgments of foreclosure). 
 129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.031 (West 2010) Minnesota applies the obligation to the 
holder of a sheriff’s certificate—issued to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, normally, 
the lending bank—but only if she knows that there is prima facie evidence of abandonment of 
the property. Id. Note that under foreclosure laws, the holder of the sheriff’s certificate is not 
the owner of the land. Id. The borrower remains the owner as she still holds the right of 
redemption. Id. 
 130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014) (creating a duty to maintain 
“vacant residential property purchased by that owner at a foreclosure sale, or acquired by that 
owner through foreclosure under a mortgage or deed of trust”). 
 131. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.032 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). Other states have also allowed 
for the shortening of the foreclosure proceeding in the case of vacant properties, but their 
statutes do not include a provision enabling the local government to force this option on the 
mortgagee. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3240(9)-(10), 600.3241, 600.3241a (West 2010 
& Supp. 2014); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1505.8 (West Supp. 2014) (following a pilot 
program adopted by the Cook County Court); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.11 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (responding to the report of the MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE 
REPORT (Jan. 11, 2012), which recommended following the example set by the Cook County 
Court in Illinois).  
 132. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION, http://www.
mortgagebankers.org/VacantPropertyRegistration.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2014); Robert Klein, 
An Outbreak of Ordinances, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1, 2008, at 46. 
 133. Courts have been even more resistant to lawsuits by local governments challenging 
directly the lending practices of banks (rather than banks’ alleged disregard of mortgaged 
properties’ level of upkeep), and claiming that they were responsible for the market’s collapse 
and the ensuing deterioration of urban neighborhoods. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009), aff’d, 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 
2010); City of Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-Ohio-1035, 2013 WL 
1183332 (8th Dist. Ohio Mar. 21, 2013). Localities’ efforts to argue that these lending practices 
represented discrimination prohibited by the Federal Housing Act have similarly failed. See 
Dekalb Cnty. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-03640-SCJ, 2013 WL 7874104 (N.D. 
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challenges to new lender obligations were based on varied claims. 
Upkeep ordinances were deemed a regulation of the credit market 
and therefore preempted by state laws governing the lending 
industry’s business practices134 or by the federal laws under which 
certain industry participants operate.135 Ordinances were also found to 
represent a form of taxation and were thus potentially subject to state 
constitutional restrictions on taxes.136 A city’s attempt to ground an 
ordinance in the obligation the city owes other residents was denied 
when the court refused to acknowledge any such municipal 
obligation.137 Finally, some courts simply determined that mortgagees 
could not be held liable to the city for the condition of properties.138 
All these varied doctrinal grounds for denying the imposition of 
an obligation on lenders rely on one key assumption: the courts 
conceive maintenance obligations as impinging on the banks’ 
traditional freedom as holders of either the property 
(postforeclosure) or a lien over it (preforeclosure).139 These 
obligations are viewed as new regulations imposed on private interest 
holders. They are treated as regulations that interfere with property 
rights and extend beyond the allowable contours of land-use 
controls.140 As a new form of regulating property rights, these 
obligations are, according to the lending industry141 and the federal 
 
Ga. Sept. 25, 2013); City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 
1706756 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011). 
 134. City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 897 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (S.D. 
Ohio 2012). 
 135. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (refusing 
to apply Chicago’s maintenance ordinance against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 136. Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2013).  
 137. City of Cincinnati, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (S.D. Ohio 2012). 
 138. Hausman v. Dayton, 653 N.E. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 1995) (dismissing the city’s code-
enforcement claims against mortgagee, and explaining that the mortgagee can only become 
liable when the mortgagor’s interest terminates). 
 139. E.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (concluding that maintenance 
duties are not traditional regulation of property, but rather, are a form of financial regulation); 
City of Cincinnati, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (denying the city’s claim that the banks’ practices 
unreasonably interfere with a common public right given that “[m]ost of the ‘practices’ the City 
targets are not inherently dangerous nor are they unlawful, such as foreclosing on mortgage 
loans, taking title to dilapidated or abandoned buildings, or selling properties at firesale 
prices”). 
 140. Keith H. Hirokawa & Ira Gonzalez, Regulating Vacant Property, 42 URB. LAW. 627, 
633–37 (2010) (criticizing vacant-property ordinances as regulations of property rights). 
 141. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION, http://www.
mortgagebankers.org/VacantPropertyRegistration.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
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housing finance agency’s legal position, “onerous,” “vague,” and 
“subjective.”142 
In other words, upkeep duties are perceived in the current legal 
struggle over lenders’ responsibilities as external to property holding: 
they are administrative regulations of private property, or taxes levied 
on private property. Given that there are many legal limits on the 
government’s ability to interfere with property—to regulate or tax 
private property—this perception facilitates the striking down of new 
ordinances imposing duties on lenders. The persistent perception of 
maintenance duties and other affirmative duties as external to 
property is an outgrowth of the attachment of American law to the 
trope of the owner’s right to let her land lie fallow or gather dust. 
Elsewhere, civil-law scholars have arguably been able to sometimes 
disassociate themselves from this trope.143 Still its grip on Anglo-
American legal thinking has been unwavering, mainly due to the 
philosophical and historical reasons described in this Part. The 
 
 142. Verified Complaint, at 2, 5, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., No. 11CV08795 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2011). The district court later accepted the position of the federal agency and 
ruled against Chicago. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 at 1061. In the spring of 
2014, the parties settled and Chicago waived its right to appeal. The federal agency agreed to 
voluntarily register all vacant properties in which it held an interest, but not to pay any fees as 
required by the local ordinance governing such interests. Mary Ellen Podmolik, Chicago, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, End Vacant Property Dispute, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2014, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-08/business/ct-chicago-vacant-buildings-0408-biz-
20140408_1_vacant-building-ordinance-vacant-properties-fannie-mae. 
 143. The French jurist Léon Duguit famously argued in the early twentieth century that 
“property is not a right; it is a social function.” According to Duguit, an owner is obliged to put 
her property to productive use, and the state is entitled to sanction her if she does not do so. 
LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE 
NAPOLÉON 21 (2d ed. 1920). Duguit was not describing the contemporary state of French law or 
the thinking of legal scholars, but rather, was criticizing legal scholars for not recognizing 
property’s social function. The extent of Duguit’s ideas’ impact on the laws of European 
countries is debatable. The German Basic Law, for example, announces: “Property entails 
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ][GG][BASIC LAW] art. 14, § 2 (Ger.). The 
Civil Code of the Netherlands contains a title “Rights and Obligations of Owners.” BW Book 5, 
Title 4 (Neth.). However, most of the obligations it lists are negative. The sole affirmative 
obligations are the duty to keep shrubs and trees within a distance from the boundary of 
adjacent land (art. 42), and the duty to maintain visible marks of the boundary (art. 46), or, in a 
built-up area, to erect a dividing wall (art. 49). Duguit’s thinking has perhaps played a greater 
role in South American legal systems. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] 
art. 58. For more on Duguit and his influence, see, for example, Nestor M. Davidson, Sketches 
for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1070 
(2011); M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 226 (2010).  
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resultant hostile approach toward lenders’ responsibilities is 
unfortunate, for as will now be clarified, this trope is simply wrong. 
II.  CURRENT PROPERTY LAW: A DUTY TO MAINTAIN  
EMBEDDED IN OWNERSHIP 
This Part detects a duty to maintain internal to property law—a 
concept that flies in the face of conventional wisdom, and contradicts 
the normative justifications for the modern institution of property 
reviewed in the preceding Part. Later, Part III shows that this last 
contradiction is illusory as the normative justifications for property in 
fact demand the duty to maintain. But first, it is necessary to 
understand the positive manner in which the duty, until now ignored, 
operates. Current law imposes the duty to maintain on the owner 
through multiple doctrines. The effect of these varied doctrines can 
best be grasped when they are categorized in accordance with the 
sanction they employ: potential monetary liability or potential loss of 
land. This Part is divided accordingly: it first uncovers doctrines that 
establish the duty through monetary sanctions, and second, it reveals 
doctrines that do so via forfeiture. The duty that crystallizes from 
these different rules will then be summarized and tied to other 
elements recognized as inherent to ownership. 
A. Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain Through Financial Liability 
One way for property law to establish a duty to maintain is to 
render an owner who neglects her land vulnerable to financial 
liability—in the form of damages or an injunction mandating repairs. 
Property law contains a wealth of rules exposing owners to such 
liability. Counting mostly common-law doctrines, but concluding with 
statutory expansions, they include waste law, negligence law as 
applied to harms to outsiders generated by the land’s conditions, 
negligence law as applied to harms to outsiders generated by 
unauthorized entrants to the land, negligence law as applied to harms 
to trespassers, private nuisance law, public nuisance law, support-
rights law, affirmative-covenants law, easements law, landlord–tenant 
law, building codes, and farming law. 
1. Waste Law.  Waste is a property-law doctrine that explicitly 
targets those who fail to maintain their land, and therefore, it is a 
natural starting point for this Part’s exploration of doctrines imposing 
a duty to maintain. At the same time, waste applies only to confined 
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settings. The doctrine solely regulates the uses of lands in which 
several parties hold interests not equal in status and effect. It 
empowers the person to whom possession of the land will inevitably 
shift at the conclusion of a lease or a specific person’s lifetime to bring 
suit to halt the present possessor from committing waste therein.144 In 
current American law, it similarly limits the freedom of those holding 
land subject to a mortgage, to protect the mortgagee’s security.145 
Waste law thus applies to tenants, life tenants, and mortgagors. 
The waste these interest-holders are prohibited from committing 
encompasses two kinds of behavior. One is “affirmative waste”: 
injurious acts the holder perpetrates on the land, such as razing a 
building.146 Another form is “permissive waste”: harms done to the 
property through the holder’s failure to act.147 This form of forbidden 
waste imposes on the present holder an affirmative duty to maintain 
the property in good repair.148 Thus, a holder of a lease, life estate, or 
mortgaged land is liable for waste if she, for example, fails to pay 
property taxes,149 allows a house to deteriorate,150 permits farmland to 
lie untilled,151 stands idle as weeds infest the land,152 stops watering a 
lawn,153 or ceases to prune and fumigate an orchard.154 
As these examples illustrate, waste law creates a conspicuous 
duty to maintain, which applies to holders of certain present estates. 
Unlike waste, the various doctrines to next be inspected in this Part 
are not quite as patent in their concern with a duty to maintain land, 
and thus have never been recognized as serving such a duty. But in 
actuality, these doctrines set a duty to maintain. Furthermore, 
because the rules presented in the subsequent Sections cover a 
markedly more diverse—sometimes all encompassing—group of 
holders of interests in land, they are much more consequential than 
waste law. 
 
 144. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2009); Pasulka v. Koob, 524 
N.E.2d 1227, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 4.6 (1997). 
 146. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, & MICHAEL SCHILL, 
PROPERTY 218 (7th ed. 2010). 
 147. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.2(8), at 737 (2d ed. 1993). 
 148. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 30.  
 149. McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d 199, 201 (Ga. 1996). 
 150. Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). 
 151. Jeffreys v. Hocutt, 142 S.E.2d 226, 228 (N.C. 1928). 
 152. Lytle v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation Dist., 154 P.2d 934, 939 (Or. 1944). 
 153. Kimbrough v. Reed, 943 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Idaho 1997). 
 154. Anderson v. Hammon, 24 P. 228, 229 (Or. 1890). 
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2. Negligence Law.  All owners—not just those subject to waste 
law (tenants, life tenants, and mortgagors)—are subject to a duty to 
maintain premised on negligence law. Negligence law presents a 
neglectful landowner with the specter of liability for injuries off the 
land caused by the condition of her land, for injuries to outsiders 
inflicted by unauthorized entrants to the landowner’s land, and for 
injuries to trespassers. 
a. Liability for Conditions Causing Injuries Off the Land.  
Owners of land are constantly under threat of liability for physical 
harms that their land’s condition may inflict on outsiders. Liability in 
negligence for such damages often results from acts the owner 
committed—such as improper construction of an awning, the 
subsequent accumulation of water on the sidewalk due to this 
improper construction, and the injury to a passerby who slipped on 
the frozen water.155 But liability can also be imposed when the owner 
did not act. Liability can be imposed in cases in which the owner’s 
neglect of her land caused injuries to others. Such negligence liability 
arising from neglect creates a duty for owners to maintain their land. 
A cursory review of cases illustrates this point. 
In several cases, owners were found liable when vegetation on 
their land blocked sightlines of motorists on adjacent roads,156 or 
interfered with sidewalks.157 Owners were charged with damages when 
trees collapsed on neighbors’ properties,158 and when tree trunks or 
roots damaged adjoining properties.159 In other cases, the owners lost 
in court when a tree’s swinging dead limbs prevented the use of a 
neighbor’s driveway,160 and when structures damaged by fire later 
collapsed on adjacent lands.161 Lawsuits against owners were also 
successful when pieces of structure fell on roads,162 and when weeds 
facilitated fire.163 An owner was even found liable for the explosion of 
a faulty gas-line located on her land although she was legally 
 
 155. McKinley v. Fanning, 595 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Idaho 1979).  
 156. Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 222 (Fla. 2001). 
 157. Rosengren v. Seattle, 205 P.3d 909, 914 (Wash. 2009).  
 158. Gibson v. Denton, 38 N.Y.S. 554, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896). 
 159. Scheckel v. NLI, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  
 160. Pesaturo v. Kinne, 20 A.3d 284, 291 (N.H. 2011). 
 161. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 109 A. 653, 658 (Pa. 1920). 
 162. Brown v. Consol. Rail Corp., 717 A.2d 309, 317 (D.C. 1998). 
 163. Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 116 P.2d 611, 620 (Cal. 
1941). 
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proscribed from attending to that gas-line. The court ruled in that 
case that the owner was under a duty to demand that the city, which 
had installed the gas-line and held exclusive rights to handle it, fix any 
leak therein.164 In perhaps the most extreme of the cases imposing 
liability, one owner was found negligent when she took no measures 
to protect a downhill neighbor from natural landsides.165 
The general rule applied in all such cases is that an owner must 
exercise reasonable care to prevent conditions on her property that 
foreseeably lead to an unreasonable risk of harm to others beyond its 
borders.166 This duty burdens all owners with the responsibility to 
inspect their property and to secure any object located therein.167 
Originally, the duty only covered artificial conditions the owner 
created (such as structures),168 but, as the cases indicate, the duty has 
expanded to “natural” conditions as well.169 The recently adopted 
Restatement (Third) of Torts reflects this trend and imposes liability 
for natural conditions, as long as the owner “knows of the risk or if 
the risk is obvious.”170 A few jurisdictions go further by jettisoning 
knowledge requirements,171 imposing strict liability when a diseased 
tree falls,172 or suggesting that dilapidated conditions alone suffice for 
an inference that the owner’s property ignited fire in adjoining 
properties.173 Even without such easing of the prerequisites for 
liability, negligence law as currently applied to harms endured outside 
the land places on an owner of land a duty to maintain her land up to 
a reasonable standard. 
b. Liability for Acts of Unauthorized Third Parties.  A 
defendant’s liability in negligence for risks generated by her land’s 
 
 164. Black v. City of Cordele, 293 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 
 165. Sprecher v. Adamson, 636 P.2d 1121, 1130 (Cal. 1981). 
 166. Custom Craft Tile, Inc. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 664 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1983); Rosengren v. City of Seattle, 205 P.3d 909, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  
 167. E.g., Marshall v. Erie Ins. Exch., 923 N.E.2d 18, 23, 24 (Ind. App. 2010). 
 168. See FRANCIS BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS 47 (1926). 
 169. The precursor of the trend was Gibson v. Denton, 38 N.Y.S. 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896). 
For an early, and positive, report on this trend, see PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (1941). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 54(b)(2) (2012). When the property is commercial knowledge is not required. Id. § 54(b)(1). 
 171. Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 222 (Fla. 2001).  
 172. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 445 (La. 1975). 
 173. See Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 113–14 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the failure to 
adequately maintain property where a fire had previously occurred could represent a breach of 
the general duty to take care that one’s use of property does not harm the person or property of 
another). 
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condition stands out in tort law. Its basis is not the defendant’s actual 
control of specific hazardous activities harming the plaintiff, as is 
normally the case in tort law, but rather, the defendant’s inherent 
control of the land she owns.174 Through the same rationale, an 
owner’s liability in negligence extends to the harms inflicted by 
others, whom she does not control, when they acted on her land, 
which she does control. For example, an owner was liable when 
trespassers used her land as dumping grounds and the debris they 
jettisoned spread fire to neighboring properties;175 when a fire erupted 
after trespassers smoked on her property;176 when her house fell into 
visible disrepair attracting fire-setting vandals;177 when trespassing 
motorcyclists used her land as a track, causing water damages to 
neighbors;178 and when an unknown trespasser raped a neighbor’s 
child in the owner’s vacant apartment.179 
In such cases, the owner is deemed responsible for the conduct of 
entrants whose acts she does not control because as the owner, she 
could have controlled their entry.180 When the owner neglected her 
land she created conditions enabling trespassers to enter, and when 
she later failed to police the trespassers’ behavior, she facilitated their 
dangerous acts. Negligence law holds her liable for consequent harms 
 
 174. Another example of tortious liability detached from control over dangerous conditions 
is defective products liability. The seller or distributer of a defective product is liable for harms 
caused by the product after the sale or distribution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
 175. See Dealers Serv. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Nat’l Stockyards, 508 N.E.2d 1241, 1244–45 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a duty to maintain that property so as to reduce the 
foreseeable risk of fire was created because the landowner had knowledge of the dumping of 
flammable materials on her property).  
 176. See Hesse v. Century Home Components, Inc., 514 P.2d 871, 873–74 (Or. 1973) (finding 
that even if a third party had actually started the fire, the landowner was still on notice 
regarding the risk of a fire, and had a duty to take reasonable care to alleviate that risk). 
 177. See Ford, 379 A.2d at 114–15 (finding that even if trespassers actually caused the fire, 
liability could still be appropriately assessed to the defendant-landowner because the 
trespassers’ actions would have remained within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by the 
dilapidated state of the defendant’s property). 
 178. See Schropp v. Solzman, 314 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 1982) (holding that because the 
landowner was aware of the damage caused to her property by the motorcyclists, she had a duty 
to take reasonable steps to reduce the risk the damage could pose to others). 
 179. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550–51 (Tex. 1985) (holding that a court 
could find the incident in question foreseeable, given the condition of the landowner’s property, 
and therefore, the landowner had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent damage to the 
property of others). 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 364(c) (1965) (“A possessor of land is 
subject to liability to others outside of the land . . . which the possessor realizes or should realize 
will involve a reasonable risk of such harm.”). 
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to outsiders, and thus, it generates a duty to maintain land so as to 
render it inhospitable to risky entrants and hazardous activities. 
c. Liability for Injuries to Trespassers.  Negligence law also 
presses owners to maintain their land through the threat of liability 
for harms incurred by individuals on the land. The common law holds 
an owner responsible for injuries sustained by others while on her 
land. Had such liability extended only to injuries suffered by 
individuals to whose entry the owner consented, it would not have 
amounted to a duty to maintain: an owner desiring to let her land 
grow wild could have simply refrained from inviting entrants. But 
liability cannot so readily be preempted. Law empowers a broader 
group—not solely invited entrants—to seek remedy when injured on 
another’s land. Because owners can be liable for injuries suffered by 
unpermitted entrants—trespassers—the duty toward entrants 
enforces on all owners a duty to maintain. 
In the common law, owners owe an entrant a sliding scale of 
duties of care linked to the legal status of the specific entrant.181 
Trespassers occupy the bottom rung of this hierarchy. Accordingly, a 
landowner owes the trespasser “the lowest standard of care . . . . The 
landowner is bound only to refrain from reckless, willful, or wanton 
conduct toward the trespasser.”182 Standing alone, this rule places on 
the owner no duty to maintain the land. It only imposes a duty to 
avoid certain acts on the land. However, most jurisdictions assign a 
higher status to some trespassers—known trespassers—and the 
correlating higher duty of care they merit does entail a duty to 
maintain. This category of trespassers consists not solely of 
trespassers whose presence the owner discovered prior to their 
injury.183 It also counts trespassers whom the owner did not discover, 
but of whose presence she should have been aware: foreseeable 
trespassers.184 An owner is deemed to have such constructive notice of 
 
 181. Traditionally, the three major statuses recognized were invitee, licensee, and trespasser. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329–32 (1965). The system was criticized and 
abandoned in many states. E.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51–52 (Mass. 1973); Webb v. 
City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732–33 (Alaska 1977). The recently adopted 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 (2012) 
rejects status-based duty rules and replaces them with a unitary duty. 
 182. Ryals v. U.S. Steel Corp., 562 So. 2d 192, 193–94 (Ala. 1990). 
 183. E.g., Moore v. Kurn, 108 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that the railroad may 
be liable to a trespasser hit by a train when said train’s engineer had observed the trespasser). 
 184. E.g., Frederick v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 10 A.2d 576, 578 (Pa. 1940) (holding that 
being on notice as to the presence of a trespasser is sufficient for a landowner to owe the 
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a trespasser when, for example, her land is habitually and manifestly 
trespassed,185 or if it houses a dangerous condition naturally attractive 
to children (the “attractive nuisance” doctrine),186 such as a timber 
stack187 or pool.188  
When the trespasser is known or foreseeable, the “standard of 
duty is the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of 
harm.”189 This duty is not a light one; indeed, it is similar to the duty 
owed to invitees. In fact, the Restatement abolishes the distinction 
between the duty owed to most trespassers and that owed to 
permitted entrants.190 Courts thus found owners liable in cases 
involving injuries to trespassers resulting from uninsulated electric 
wires,191 furrows,192 waste-induced fires,193 a collapsing dump,194 an 
unmarked barbed wire fence,195 a pond,196 and a river-crossing.197 
Naturally, the duty to protect trespassers has its limits. Some 
courts note that liability is restricted to conditions presenting risk of 
serious bodily injury.198 Liability is also sometimes confined to injuries 
 
trespasser a duty of care); Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 499 (Ill. 1992) (adopting 
the rule that if a landowner should reasonably know that a trespasser would be exposed to 
danger on her land, then a duty of care toward that trespasser would arise). 
 185. See Imre v. Riegel Paper Co., 132 A.2d 505, 509–10 (N.J. 1957) (holding that indications 
that trespassers frequently entered a potentially dangerous area should have been sufficient to 
put the landowner on notice of a duty of care owed to those trespassers). 
 186. The doctrine is traced to Sioux City v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 657 (1873). 
 187. See generally Bransom v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 (1884) (finding that a landowner owed a 
duty to a trespassing child who could not have known of the danger posed by a negligently 
stacked pile of timber). 
 188. See generally King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98, 100–01 (Cal. 1959) (holding that due to the 
plaintiff’s young age, the danger of drowning posed by a swimming pool would not have been 
apparent, and the doctrine of attractive nuisance should therefore apply). But see Mozier v. 
Parsons, 887 P.2d 692, 698 (Kan. 1995) (stating generally that pools are not attractive 
nuisances). 
 189. See Imre, 132 A.2d at 508. 
 190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 
(2012). The only entrants to whom this duty does not apply are “flagrant trespassers.” Id. § 52. 
Although they are not defined, the section notes that a significant factor must be their intent to 
commit an illegal act. Id. 
 191. Wytupeck v. Camden, 136 A.2d 887, 896 (N.J. 1957). 
 192. Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A.2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1953). 
 193. Strang v. S. Jersey Broad. Co., 86 A.2d 777, 780 (N.J. 1952). 
 194. Imre, 132 A.2d at 511. 
 195. Webster v. Culbertson, 761 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. 1988). 
 196. Pocholec v. Giustina, 355 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Or. 1960). 
 197. City of Hous. v. Cavazos, 811 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex. App. 1991). 
 198. E.g., Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 71 P.3d 359, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. g 
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sustained due to conditions the entrant should not have noticed 
herself,199 or to those arising from artificial conditions.200 Furthermore, 
whereas in extreme cases the duty toward trespassers imposes a duty 
to reconfigure the land,201 often the owner can dispense with her duty 
by giving trespassers adequate warning of dangerous conditions.202 
Still, through negligence liability toward trespassers, the law imposes 
on an owner a duty to maintain her land so as to limit the 
development of, or the risk posed to others by, dangerous conditions 
on the land.203 
3. Nuisance Law.  Negligence law renders an owner liable when 
others or their properties are injured due to the unreasonable 
condition of the owner’s land. It thus incentivizes an owner to 
maintain her land to prevent accidents. This incentive to maintain is 
reinforced through nuisance law, which exposes an owner who fails to 
maintain her land to financial liability even when its neglected state 
does not precipitate an accident. A nuisance claim does not require 
the plaintiff to sustain an injury, as it protects individuals not from 
interferences with their bodily integrity or the wholeness of their 
property, but rather from interferences with their use or enjoyment of 
the property.204 Such interferences need not result in physical injury, 
and they may affect one private owner’s ability to use or enjoy her 
land or the whole public’s ability to do so. 
a. Private Nuisance Law.  In the typical nuisance case, an activity 
one owner engages in on her land detrimentally affects another 
owner’s enjoyment of her land without physically harming it. For 
example, there may be liability for nuisance when one owner’s 
 
(2012) (“A land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to entrants on the land with regard to 
all risks that exist on the land.”). 
 199. E.g., State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 290 (Tex. 2006). But see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. k (2012) (“[T]he fact 
that a dangerous condition is open and obvious bears on the assessment of whether reasonable 
care was employed, but it does not pretermit the land possessor’s liability.”). 
 200. E.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 521 P.2d 340, 345 (Or. 1974). But see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51, cmt. f (2012) (“The duty 
of reasonable care imposed on a land possessor includes risks arising from natural conditions.”). 
 201. Sirek v. State, 496 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Minn. 1993). 
 202. Green-Glo Turf Farms v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1984). 
 203. “Generally, a landowner owes a duty of care to maintain his or her property in a 
reasonably safe condition.” Gronski v. Cnty. of Monroe, 963 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (N.Y. 2011). 
 204. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Superior Ct., 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996). 
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business, operated on her land, exposes another owner’s land to loud 
noises or foul odors.205 
Similar detrimental effects sometimes result not from the 
owner’s activities on her land, but from her failure to act and regulate 
her land’s conditions. An individual’s ability to enjoy her property is 
decreased when a dilapidated property is located in the vicinity, and 
hence that dilapidated property can qualify as a nuisance. For 
example, courts found neglectful owners whose lands became hubs 
for illegal activity, such as drug dealing, liable for nuisance due to 
their neighbors’ lost sense of safety and the resultant decrease in the 
value of their properties. Such suits were upheld despite the fact that 
the owner-defendants neither participated in, nor authorized, the 
illegal activity taking place on their property.206 As one court 
explained, “[a] property owner cannot knowingly allow his property 
to become a haven for criminals to the detriment of his neighbors and 
deny that his property has become a nuisance because the resulting 
criminal activities are those of third parties.”207 Owners, another court 
declared, must “take all reasonable measures available to them to 
control their property.”208 
To further broaden owners’ nuisance liability for failing to 
maintain their properties, some states have turned to legislative 
reform. California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
Act209 renders a space used by gang members a private nuisance for 
which its owner may be found liable.210 Even more prominently, some 
state statutes now explicitly define as nuisances all decrepit and 
untended properties that adversely affect the value of surrounding 
properties or represent a hazard to the wellbeing of their dwellers. In 
 
 205. E.g., Kriener v. Turkey, 212 N.W.2d 526, 539 (Iowa 1973) (odor as nuisance); Stevens v. 
Rockport Granite, 104 N.E. 371, 376 (Mass. 1914) (noise as nuisance).  
 206. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 47 (Ct. App. 1993); Kelly v. Boys’ Club of 
St. Louis, 588 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). But see City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159, 
169 (Wash. App. 2000) (an owner may be liable only when she had notice, or should have had 
notice, of illegal activity); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (West 2013) (establishing administrative 
boards to resolve nuisance complaints brought by neighbors against owners in whose property 
illegal activity was taking place); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.042 (West 2011) 
(empowering neighbors to demand a meeting to present evidence of illegal activity to the 
district attorney who can pursue a nuisance claim on their behalf). 
 207. Kelly, 588 S.W.2d at 257. 
 208. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.  
 209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a (West 2014). 
 210. Id. Claimants are always eligible for an injunction. Damages can also be awarded if the 
owner knew, or should have known, of the illegal activities. 
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accordance, nearby owners are empowered to bring private nuisance 
suits.211 These recent expansive interpretations of the term 
“nuisance,” in conjunction with the rulings extending liability for 
illegal activities by third parties, transform private nuisance law into a 
tool that imposes on owners a duty to maintain. 
b. Public Nuisance Law.  An owner’s neglect of her land does not 
solely interfere with one neighbor’s, or a handful of neighbors’, 
enjoyment of their properties. Rather, it often impacts a broader 
community—sometimes an entire neighborhood. Property law has a 
separate category of rules to regulate such interferences with the 
wellbeing of whole swaths of the public—the aptly titled public 
nuisance law. With case law burgeoning since the 1990s,212 public 
nuisance law is now an even more profuse source of a duty to 
maintain than private nuisance law. 
In general, “[a] public nuisance is an unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public.”213 This broad definition 
can easily be used to impose obligations on owners to act on their 
land, because, as one court explained, an unreasonable interference 
might be inaction that “works some substantial annoyance, 
inconvenience, or injury to the public.”214 The requirement is not that 
some individual be actually annoyed or injured by the owner’s failure 
to act; it suffices that such failure tends to inconvenience the public.215 
Thus, under public nuisance law, owners were found liable for not 
treating still water on their land that may have contributed to the 
spread of malaria;216 for retaining abandoned bridge piers;217 for 
permitting corn to obstruct a public road;218 for not removing a dead 
 
 211. MO. ANN. STAT. § 82.1025 (West 1998 & Supp. 2014) (granting right of suit to “[a]ny 
property owner who owns property within a reasonable distance”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3767.41 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014) (granting right of suit and expanding the range of remedies 
available to “neighbors” owning property within five-hundred feet of a dilapidated building). 
 212. SINGER, supra note 30, at 123. 
 213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Some definitions are more precise. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2012) (“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time 
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons . . . .”). 
 214. Commonwealth v. S. Covington & C. St. Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 583 (1918). 
 215. Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 Ill. 628, 636 (1905). 
 216. See Mills v. Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (holding that the dam 
erected by defendant and rendering the surrounding area unhealthy was a public nuisance). 
 217. United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
 218. Guy v. State, 438 A.2d 1250, 1255 (Del. Super. 1981). 
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tree;219 for allowing runoff water to freeze on an adjacent sidewalk;220 
and for not securing abandoned buildings.221 As these examples 
illustrate, public nuisance law creates an obligation toward the 
community to reasonably maintain one’s property.222 
4. Servitudes Law.  When established through negligence or 
nuisance, the maintenance standard the duty to maintain imposes is 
grounded in reasonableness. A harsher maintenance requirement 
extending beyond a reasonableness standard is instituted through 
servitudes law—including support rights, affirmative covenants, and 
easements. 
a. Support Rights.  All landowners have an absolute right to 
lateral support: “to have the soil in its natural condition supported by 
the soil of adjoining land in its natural conditions.”223 In light of this 
“original right incident to [every man’s] property,”224 which “stands on 
natural justice, and is not dependent upon grant,”225 law imposes on 
all owners a duty not to interfere with the lateral support their land 
provides to neighboring lands.226 The neighbor’s right for such support 
of her land is a servitude—it is a nonpossessory interest burdening 
another owner’s land.227 A breach of this right of the neighbor exposes 
the owner to liability, even if she behaved reasonably.228 
The duty to respect the neighbor’s right to support is first and 
foremost a negative obligation.229 The typical interference with lateral 
support occurs when excavation works disturb a neighboring land’s 
 
 219. Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry., 227 N.W. 385, 386 (Wis. 1929). 
 220. Leahan v. Cochran, 60 N.E. 382, 382 (Mass. 1901). 
 221. Sanford v. Detroit, 371 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). 
 222. Historically, public nuisance claims were pursued by public officials, rather than private 
individuals. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984). But today, all 
individuals can seek injunctions against public nuisances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 821C(2)(c) (1979). To seek damages, they must endure “special injury”—a harm distinct from 
that the public suffered. E.g., Phila. Elec. v. Hercules, 762 F.2d 303, 315–16. (3d Cir. 1985). 
 223. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 69.01.  
 224. Hunt v. Peake, [1860] 70 Eng. Rep. 605. 
 225. Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, 3 (1885). 
 226. E.g., Prete v. Cray, 141 A. 609, 611 (R.I. 1928). 
 227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1) (2000).  
 228. E.g., Tunstall, 80 Va. at 3. 
 229. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877) (“[E]ach owner has the absolute right to 
have his land remain in its natural condition, unaffected by any act of his neighbor . . . .”). 
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support.230 The duty is, however, transformed into an affirmative 
obligation—a duty to maintain—in cases involving retaining walls. 
When a wall on one owner’s land supports the soil of another’s, 
courts hold that the owner has “the obligation to maintain the wall to 
support the [neighbor’s] land.”231 The owner is liable if, even while 
behaving reasonably, she fails to maintain the retaining wall whose 
conditions deteriorate, thereby causing the neighboring land to 
subside.232 An owner might even be forced to construct a wall to 
prevent her land from eroding onto another’s land.233 
The duty to maintain retaining walls is a duty attached to the 
ownership of the property on which the wall is situated, that is, it runs 
with the land. Not only is the owner who built the wall responsible for 
its maintenance, but so too are her successors.234 In this important 
respect, the affirmative duty to maintain retaining walls goes beyond 
the typical negative duty not to interfere with lateral support. Most 
courts hold that subsequent owners are not liable for their 
predecessors’ withdrawal of lateral support.235 Even if the effects of 
the withdrawal are felt during the current owner’s tenure (that is, only 
then does the neighboring land subside), she is not responsible for 
excavations performed earlier. Liability attaches to the excavating 
owner, not to the land.236 Thus, in most states, if an owner excavated 
and removed support for neighboring land, her successor is freed 
from any duty. If, however, that owner replaced said support with a 
retaining wall, the successor carries a duty to maintain the wall.237 This 
result is best explained when support duties are conceived as duties to 
maintain. An owner is subject to a duty to maintain the support 
 
 230. E.g., Kelley v. Falangus, 388 P.2d 223, 224 (Wash. 1964); Dyer v. St. Paul, 8 N.W. 272, 
272 (Minn. 1881). 
 231. Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 223 (W. Va. 1982). 
 232. E.g., Gorton v. Schofield, 41 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 1942); Urosevic v Hayes, 590 S.W.2d 
77, 79 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979). 
 233. Fabbri v. Regis Forcier, 330 A.2d 807, 809–10 (R.I. 1975). 
 234. Gorton, 41 N.E.2d at 15. 
 235. Keck v. Longoria, 771 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Spoo v. Garvin, 32 S.W.2d 
715, 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930). But see Gladin v. Von Engeln, 575 P.2d 418, 421–22 (Colo. 1978). 
 236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817 cmt. j (emphasis added) (“The person 
liable under the rule . . . is the actor who withdraws the naturally necessary support.”). 
 237. See Frederick v. Burg, 148 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (explicitly drawing the 
distinction between the subsequent owner’s lack of liability for excavation work done by her 
predecessor and her liability for maintaining a retaining wall constructed by that predecessor).  
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provided by her land to neighboring soil as that support existed at the 
time she assumed ownership.238 
b. Affirmative Covenants.  Servitudes for support are “natural.” 
Other kinds of servitudes must be created by private parties. Yet 
these other servitudes may also institute a property-law duty to 
maintain. For, although non-natural servitudes are always traceable 
to an agreement between owners, they are rights and duties in 
property, rather than in contract, meaning that they run with the 
land.239 In other words, an owner must abide by the servitude even if 
she herself was not a party to the agreement creating it. Servitudes 
that oblige all future owners to perform an act on the land—for 
example, maintain it—are called affirmative covenants.240 
Examples of affirmative covenants are obligations to provide 
heat to a building,241 to conserve a historic structure,242 to care for a 
fence,243 to keep a sewer in good condition,244 to maintain a bridge and 
replace it if destroyed,245 to landscape,246 and to preserve land in a 
manner preventing declines in the value of surrounding properties.247 
The most popular affirmative covenant nowadays is an obligation to 
pay homeowners association fees to fund the maintenance of 
common premises.248 
The onus on an owner of land subject to an affirmative covenant 
to maintain can be weighty. She will be obliged to carry the costs of 
abiding by the covenant, regardless of her choice to refrain from using 
the land, and even when the land cannot be used. The case of Pocono 
v. MacKenzie249 represents this extreme result. The MacKenzies held 
 
 238. Note, however, that the dilapidated state of the wall at the time the land was purchased 
by the defendant does not immunize her from liability. Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 225 (W. 
Va. 1982). 
 239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.3(1) (2000). 
 240. Id. § 1.3(2). 
 241. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty, 164 N.E.2d 832, 835 (N.Y. 1959). 
 242. Historic Green Springs v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
 243. E.g., Concklin v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 134 N.Y.S. 191, 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912). 
 244. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 749 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D.R.I. 1990). 
 245. E.g., Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 212 S.E.2d 715, 718 
(Va. 1975). 
 246. E.g., Skyline Woods Homeowners Ass’n v. Broekemeier, 758 N.W.2d 376, 390 (2008). 
 247. See id. 
 248. E.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 
(N.Y. 1938).  
 249. Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
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vacant land subject to an affirmative covenant to pay association fees. 
After purchasing the land, they discovered that it could not meet 
municipal sewage requirements, and therefore could not be 
developed. Consequently, they were not only unable to use the land, 
but they also could not dispose of it. When the land was put on the 
market, no buyers materialized; when offered to the homeowners 
association as a gift, the association declined; and, when property 
taxes were withheld, the locality refused to take possession.250 Still, the 
court decided that the MacKenzies must abide by the affirmative 
covenant and pay the association fees. As a result, the property 
became a negative-value asset. 
Affirmative covenants lead to a similar eventuality in other, less 
extreme, scenarios. For example, in several cases owners were forced 
to maintain golf courses in accordance with an affirmative covenant 
even when the courses became unprofitable.251 In these and similar 
cases involving affirmative covenants, courts have held that as long as 
the covenant—that mandates the maintenance of a golf course, 
payment of fees for maintenance of common premises, or any other 
obligation—meaningfully benefits others, it must be enforced against 
the owner.252 
c. Easements.  As seen, the law of servitudes benefits the holder 
of a servitude—for example, of a support right or of an affirmative 
covenant—by empowering her to force the owner of the subjected 
land, known as the “servient estate,” to maintain that land. With 
respect to another category of servitudes, easements, the law of 
servitudes performs the reverse. Easements are servitudes whose 
holders have the right to enter another’s land and do something on 
it.253 Examples of easements are a right of way or a right to install 
pipes. An easement thereby benefits its holder. But it also places a 
duty on her. The holder of an easement may not exercise her 
easement in a way that places an undue burden upon the servient 
estate.254 This restriction engenders a duty to repair and maintain an 
easement to prevent injury to the servient estate. For example, the 
owner of a right of way may not stand idle as the cattle guards along 
 
 250. Id. at 235. 
 251. E.g., Heatherwood Holdings LLC v. First Commercial Bank, 61 So.3d 1012, 1024 (Ala. 
2010); Shalimar Ass’n v. D.O.C. Enters. Ltd., 688 P.2d 682, 683 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).  
 252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10 cmt. c (2000). 
 253. Id. § 1.2(1). 
 254. Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 371 P.2d 647, 656–57 (Nev. 1962). 
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the road deteriorate and fail to protect livestock on the servient 
estate.255 The owner of an irrigation easement may not allow it to 
overgrow with vegetation, become obstructed by debris, and gush 
with polluted water.256 Thus, easements law, albeit mostly concerned 
with privileging a holder of an easement to use another’s land, also 
places on the holder of an easement the duty to maintain the portions 
of land that her easement covers. 
5. Landlord–Tenant Law.  Servitudes mandating maintenance 
play a key role in one specialized area of property law: landlord–
tenant law. The lease creating the tenancy is a series of covenants—
obligations between the landlord and the tenant.257 In addition to 
these explicit and voluntary promises, there are implicit covenants 
that courts or legislatures insert into all leases, regardless of the 
parties’ desires. Many such legally created obligations impose on 
landlords assorted duties to maintain. These include a duty to 
maintain the building’s common spaces in a safe condition258 and to 
protect tenants’ premises from third parties’ illegal activities.259 Most 
prominently, the obligations to which a landlord is subjected by law 
encompass a warranty of habitability: the unwaivable obligation to 
maintain leased premises in livable conditions.260 The warranty, often 
drawing on detailed municipal codes, consists of specific and rigorous 
requirements, such as the provision of heat and water, garbage 
removal, and the insulation of windows.261 
Given that the warranty is inherent to landlord–tenant law, the 
potent duty to maintain it institutes endures for as long as the 
landlord–tenant relationship lasts. Thus, owners who seek to evade 
the duty—because they cannot afford, or do not wish, to maintain 
their properties—can simply opt to avoid or abandon the rental 
 
 255. Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 256. City of Turlock v. Bristow, 284 P. 962, 965 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930); see also Powers v. 
Grenier Constr. Inc., 524 A.2d 667, 669 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (concluding the drainage-
easement holder was liable for flooding the servient estate due to his failure to repair the 
drainage system). 
 257. WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 244 (3d ed. 
2000) (defining tenancy). 
 258. E.g., King v. G & M Realty Corp., 370 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Mass. 1977). 
 259. E.g., Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 77 (N.J. 1975). 
 260. The warranty was first recognized in Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 
1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970). It has since been adopted by most states. ROBERT SCHOSHINSKI, 
AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:16, n.30 (1980). 
 261. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 326 (1972). 
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market. In some jurisdictions, however, this course of action is 
unavailable because owners’ ability to control their statuses as 
landlords is restricted. Anti-eviction laws (enumerating allowable 
causes for removing tenants),262 rent-control laws (setting maximum 
rates for rent increases),263 or condominium-conversion laws 
(regulating the transformation of rental units into individually owned 
units),264 limit a landlord’s ability to terminate a landlord–tenant 
relationship, even after the lease expires.265 Such laws might even ban 
the owner from removing the unit from the market and moving into it 
herself.266 In tandem with obligations to maintain leased properties, 
any such restriction on the owner’s ability to terminate leases 
generates a duty to maintain units that is costly, and in radical cases, 
even impossible, to escape. 
6. State and Local Statutory Maintenance Obligations.  The duties 
a landlord owes to her tenant draw on both common-law and 
statutory origins. There are also rules imposing a detailed duty to 
maintain that are fully based on statute. These rules supplement the 
common-law doctrines reviewed earlier in this Section. Building laws 
and ordinances, which most states and cities now boast, present a 
prime example. They enforce maintenance standards on all owners 
regardless of the use to which they put their property (that is, even if 
the property is not leased) through fines and repair orders. 
Although the specific maintenance standards vary by 
jurisdiction, their characteristics can be gauged through Chicago’s 
 
 262. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 263. E.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2101. 
 264. Condominium-conversion statutes can, for example, place a moratorium on 
conversions, assure tenants a right to buy their units for a set price, or forbid eviction of certain 
tenants. See, e.g., 1983 Mass. Acts 1926; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.22–65 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2014). 
 265. When challenged by landlords as takings, these laws were mostly deemed 
constitutional. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54, 157–58 (1921) (upholding rent control); 
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 524–25, 549 (1992) (upholding rent-control law prohibiting 
eviction of mobile-home dwellers); San Remo Hotel v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 
2002) (upholding an ordinance mandating payments by the owners of single-occupancy hotel 
units before converting them to tourist use). 
 266. See, e.g., Flynn v. Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335, 337, 339–40 (Mass. 1981) (upholding a 
statute that prohibited a condominium owner from reoccupying one of his own units); Puttrich 
v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842, 843–44 (App. Div. 1979) (upholding a similar statute in New Jersey). But 
see Cwynar v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 233, 238–40, 245–46 (2001) 
(holding that a similar ordinance could constitute a taking). 
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building ordinance.267 Chicago requires owners to keep their buildings 
or units in “a clean, sanitary and safe condition”268 and “exterminate 
any insects, rodents or other pests therein.”269 Every lot must “be 
graded and drained so as to prevent the accumulation of stagnant 
water.”270 The foundations must fully support the building, and all 
exterior walls and roofs must be whole.271 In addition, like many of its 
peers,272 Chicago singles out vacant properties for particularly invasive 
treatment. The owners of such properties must, among other 
obligations, register their properties with the city and pay fees;273 
retain an occupied local address;274 carry liability insurance;275 keep all 
grass below ten inches high;276 preserve windows, doors, porches, 
decks, and stoops in sound condition;277 light exit areas;278 prevent 
trash accumulation;279 and secure the building.280 Importantly, these 
 
 267. Comparable codes have been adopted in other cities. See PHILA. CODE §§ PM-304–305 
(2007); HOUS. TEX., ORDINANCE §§ 10-361, 363, 364 (2011), available at 
http://www.houstontx.gov/codes. Similar statewide codes have also been adopted. See N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 1226.1 (adopted 2010). 
 268. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 13-196-620 (a) (2013). 
 269. Id. § 13-196-620(c). 
 270. Id. § 13-196-600. 
 271. Id. § 13-196-530. 
 272. E.g., PHILA. CODE § PM-306; L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 91.8904. In addition, in a law 
applicable to Los Angeles and San Diego, the California legislature shortened the notice period 
required before the enforcement agency may act against a vacant, substandard, single-family 
dwelling. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17980.9 (West 2006). Indiana adopted a different 
approach. Under its Unsafe Building Law, vacant and unmaintained properties are defined as 
unsafe buildings, and are thus susceptible to the plethora of administrative sanctions available 
for governments dealing with unsafe buildings. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4(a)(6) (LexisNexis 
2009 & Supp. 2014). Further, the Indiana law specifically encourages local governments to 
adopt, with respect to such structures, “maintenance and repair standards appropriate for the 
community.” IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4.5 (LexisNexis 2009). Michigan established special 
administrative-hearing bureaus to adjudicate and impose sanctions on the violations of local 
codes designated as “blight” violations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 117.4q (West 2006 & Supp. 
2014). Congress has considered providing federal funding to municipalities for expanded and 
improved code enforcement, as well as other local mechanisms for dealing with vacant 
properties. The Community Regeneration, Sustainability, and Innovation Act of 2009. (S. 453 
H.R. 932 (111th)), reintroduced as The Community Regeneration, Sustainability, and 
Innovation Act of 2011 (H.R. 790).  
 273. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 13-12-125(a)(1). 
 274. Id. § 13-12-125(a)(2). 
 275. Id. § 13-12-125(c). 
 276. Id. § 13-12-135(a)(1).  
 277. Id. § 13-12-135(b)(3); § 13-12-135(b)(6). 
 278. Id. § 13-12-135(b)(7).  
 279. Id. § 13-12-135(c)(1). 
 280. Id. § 13-12-140. 
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and other building code obligations may be enforced against an 
owner whether or not the neglect presents a danger to outsiders.281 
These extensive maintenance obligations under state and local laws 
illustrate that the characterization of property rights as encompassing 
a freedom to let property lie fallow or gather dust is simply 
inaccurate—at least in urban or suburban settings. 
7. Farming Law.  Although the owners of rural lands are mostly 
not subject to building codes, they too cannot let their lands lie fallow 
or gather dust. Like all other owners, they are subject to negligence 
and nuisance liability for damages arising from the state of their 
lands.282 There is solely one category of rural cases in which courts 
remain loath to impose liability in negligence or nuisance: cases in 
which damages result from the spread of noxious fauna or flora from 
neglected farmland.283 However, even in such instances, owners are 
not shielded from the specter of legal responsibility. Since the early 
twentieth century, statutes impose a duty to maintain in many of 
these situations, sometimes going as far as to criminalize a 
farmholder’s failure to combat wild plants.284 Thus, owners’ liberty to 
neglect, or let their rural land lie fallow, is very limited. 
Indeed, the particular practice of letting rural land lie fallow has 
become the subject of legal challenges. When agricultural land is 
farmed ineffectively or not at all, sand, soil, and weeds can blow onto 
neighbors’ lands. Nevertheless, at an earlier time, courts were 
unwilling to entertain negligence or other claims against farmers who 
let their land lie fallow—cleared, unirrigated, and unplowed.285 Over 
the years, however, courts began to condition their approval of such 
practices on proof that leaving land fallow for a certain time is “in 
 
 281. Vill. of Ringwood v. Foster, 932 N.E.2d 461, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  
 282. See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
 283. A late nineteenth-century English judge dismissed such a case with two sentences: “I 
never heard of such an action as this. There can be no duty as between adjoining occupiers to 
cut the thistles, which are the natural growth of the soil.” Giles v. Walker [1890] 24 L.R. 656, 657 
(Q.B. Div.); see also Boarts v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 182 P.2d 246, 248 (1947) (holding “no duty 
rested on the defendant to cut or destroy weeds”); Belhumeur v. Zilm, 157 N.H. 233, 236 (2008) 
(holding the owner not liable for the “independent acts of wild animals”—in this case, the 
actions of the bees nesting in a tree on her property). 
 284. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 15-16-7-1–15 (LexisNexis 2008) (noxious weed 
eradication); id. §§ 15-16-8-1–14 (LexisNexis 2008) (destruction of certain detrimental plants); 
Vance v. S. Kan. Ry. of Tex., 152 S.W. 743, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (interpreting a statute 
making it illegal to permit Russian thistles to go to seed). 
 285. E.g., Stewart v. Birchfield, 114 P. 999 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1911). 
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accordance with good farming methods” in the specific area and for 
the particular crop.286 This requirement renders precarious the legal 
status of neglectful owners who let their rural land lie fallow for no 
persuasive reason.287 This line of decisions amplifies the duty to 
maintain that already burdens rural owners, and specifically 
undermines the supposed general right to let one’s property lie 
fallow. 
B. Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain Through Loss of Property 
The law subjects owners to a duty to maintain their lands 
because, as seen in the preceding Section, neglectful owners are 
vulnerable to monetary judgments or injunctions. The law also, as this 
Section illustrates, threatens such inattentive owners with the 
potential loss of their land. This sanction is often harsher than 
financial liability. For, when imposed, it leaves the owner without her 
property and, at least in most cases, without its worth. Yet there are 
circumstances in which financial liability is the more severe sanction, 
even though it leaves the owner with her property. When an owner’s 
land can be put to no productive use—that is, when it is valueless—its 
loss causes the owner no harm, whereas imposing any financial 
liability on the land transforms it into a negative-value asset. Because 
in American law owners cannot relinquish their land,288 negative-value 
land drains the owner’s other resources. The predicament of the 
holders of Detroit properties offered for one dollar serves as an 
example.289 These owners would, in all likelihood, welcome a rule 
divesting them of their lands (and, as explained below, Michigan may 
indeed formulate such a rule).290 Theirs is an exceptional case 
however. Most lands are not valueless, and, accordingly, most owners 
are apprehensive about losing their land. Hence rules imposing the 
duty to maintain through potential loss of land are effective tools 
promoting the duty. These rules include eminent domain, improving 
trespasser, adverse possession, and nuisance abatement and property 
rehabilitation statutes. 
 
 286. Preston v. Schrenk, 295 P.2d 272, 273 (Idaho 1956); Hoover v. Horton, 209 S.W.2d 646, 
649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Robinson v. Whitelaw, 364 P.2d 1085, 1085 (Utah 1961). 
 287. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 32 (cautioning that such practices are 
unlikely to be upheld).  
 288. Peñalver, supra note 28. 
 289. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 290. See infra note 323.  
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1. Eminent Domain.  Eminent domain is the government’s power 
to take private property for public uses.291 The government can take 
whichever properties are necessary for the planned public use, 
irrespective of the properties’ level of upkeep.292 However, 
undermaintained properties are, and always were, particularly 
attractive candidates for exercises of the eminent-domain power.293 
Indeed, the federal Constitution incentivizes governments to target 
these properties because of the two restrictions it places on eminent 
domain.294 First, under the federal Constitution, a government 
condemning property must pay just compensation, equaling the 
market value of the property.295 The value of the property is higher 
when the property is well-maintained, and therefore, the law 
encourages a government to take a neglected property, rather than 
one that is well-maintained, when either can serve a public project. 
An even stronger incentive for the government to select 
neglected properties is created by the second requirement for a 
constitutional exercise of the eminent-domain power: that the land be 
taken for a “public use.”296 Justifiably or not, government officials 
routinely and successfully claim that taking neglected properties is 
inherently a public use, regardless of the nature of the government’s 
eventual use of the land.297 Moreover, during the first decade and a 
half of the twenty-first century, as criticism grew of the taking of 
properties and their transfer to private developers, states amended 
their laws to limit the reach of takings for such economic 
 
 291. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1875). 
 292. Nat’l Docks Ry. v. Cent. R.R., 32 N.J. Eq. 755, 763 (1880) (“[The power of eminent 
domain] is primarily an absolute one . . . . In the constituted government of this state, the right 
of exercising it has been confided to the legislature, restricted by only two conditions: one, that 
compensation shall be made to the owner of the property taken; the other, that the use for 
which property may be taken shall be a public use. In other respects it is without limit.”). 
 293. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The clearance, replanning, development or 
redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private 
property may be taken . . . .”).  
 294. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 295. See id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”) 
 296. Id. 
 297. For an overview and critique of this position, see generally Steven Eagle, Does Blight 
Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007); see also New Orleans Redevelopment 
Auth. v. Burgess, 16 So. 3d 569, 583–85 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the expropriation of 
blighted property served a public purpose, and thus did not violate the Louisiana Constitution, 
even though ownership was to be transferred to a private third party). 
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development to “blighted properties” alone.298 Elsewhere, state courts 
interpreted their constitutions similarly,299 and four dissenting 
Supreme Court Justices read the federal Constitution in a 
corresponding vein.300 
Statutory definitions of the “blighted” conditions that legitimize 
takings for economic development under these new restrictions 
encompass most failures to maintain land. In Alabama, for example, a 
property is blighted if it is dilapidated, unsanitary, overcrowded, a fire 
hazard, disconnected from utilities or sewage, overgrown with 
noxious weeds, a haven for rodents, or a dumping ground.301 
Definitions of blight can be broader and vaguer still,302 and 
consequently, owners who fail to meet a not-trifling maintenance 
standard are vulnerable to takings for economic development—
takings against which owners maintaining their land are now immune. 
Thus, current rules expand eminent domain’s role as a tool enforcing 
a duty to maintain. Neglectful owners are subject to a heightened risk 
of land loss for traditional public projects, and in many states, they 
are the sole owners subject to the risk of land loss for economic 
development. 
2. Improving Trespasser.  When a private owner fails to maintain 
her land, the risk that title will be removed and vested in the 
government increases. So does the likelihood that title will be lost in 
favor of another private individual. One doctrine producing this result 
is the law of the improving trespasser. When an unauthorized 
individual makes improvements—say, builds structures—on another’s 
land, she is committing trespass, regardless of the land’s prior 
condition.303 Still, in most states304 the owner cannot remove the 
 
 298. E.g., Act of Aug. 25, 2006, 2006 Ala. Acts 584 (codified as ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014)); Act of June 14, 2006, 2006 Iowa Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1001, § 3 
(West) (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West 2008 & Supp. 2014)); Act of 
Sept. 1, 2005, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (codified as TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2014)).  
 299. E.g., Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); Karesh v. City Council of 
Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978). 
 300. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 498–502 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 301. ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c).  
 302. E.g., Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1143 (Ohio 2006) (striking down an 
ordinance that applied too vague a definition of the phrase “deteriorating area”). 
 303. Trespass is “a physical intrusion upon the land of another without the proper 
permission.” Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (citation omitted). An object 
can physically intrude, and hence, unauthorized construction of a building on another’s land 
constitutes trespass. See id. 
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trespasser and keep those improvements.305 As the recently adopted 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment explains, 
the trespasser who mistakenly improved another’s land “has a claim 
in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”306 
To prevent unjust enrichment, a court may order the owner to 
pay the trespasser for the improvements she made to the land. 
Alternatively, the court may force the owner to sell the land to the 
trespasser in exchange for the land’s market value.307 A court will 
award one of these remedies if it concludes that when balanced 
against the interests of the owner, the trespasser’s interests prevail. 
The different balancing tests vary in name and origin—some are 
statutory, others judicial—but under all of them the owner is more 
likely to lose her land (that is, be forced to convey it to the trespasser) 
if the land is unimproved or undermaintained.308 
A major factor a court considers before ruling that the balancing 
favors the trespasser is the extent of loss the owner will sustain if her 
land is awarded to the trespasser. Such loss is small in cases of 
unimproved land,309 especially when the owner cannot show a plan to 
maintain the land.310 In addition, courts place much weight on the 
timing of the owner’s complaint against the trespasser. If the owner 
delays, courts are hostile to her request to preserve title.311 An owner 
 
 304. In the past, the rule was different. E.g., Geragosian v. Union Realty, 193 N.E. 726, 728 
(Mass. 1935) (“The facts [sic] that the aggrieved owner suffers little or no damage from the 
trespass . . . [or] that the wrongdoer acted in good faith and would be put to disproportionate 
expense by removal of the trespassing structures . . . are ordinarily no reasons for denying an 
injunction. Rights in real property cannot ordinarily be taken from the owner at a valuation . . . . 
The general rule is that the owner of land is entitled to an injunction for the removal of 
trespassing structures.” (citations omitted)).  
 305. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 82–85 (2004). 
 306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011). 
 307. See Rzeppa v. Seymour, 203 N.W. 62, 63 (Mich. 1925). 
 308. For different balancing tests, see generally Culbreath v. Parker, 717 So. 2d 430 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1998) (“balancing the equities”); Golden Press v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1951) 
(“relative hardship” test); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.3 (West 1980 & Supp. 2014) (requiring 
courts to award relief that “is consistent with substantial justice to the parties under the 
circumstances”). 
 309. E.g., Golden Press, 235 P.2d at 596; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (2011) (“The . . . showing of unjust enrichment . . . may be 
very strong, particularly where the value of the improvements greatly exceeds the value of the 
unimproved property.”). 
 310. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.4 (West 1980) (“[T]he court shall take into consideration 
any plans the owner of the land may have for the use or development of the land . . . .”). 
 311. E.g., Myers v. Yingling, 279 S.W.3d 83 (Ark. 2008); Stewart Sterk, Strict Liability and 
Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2129, 2156–57 (2012). 
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is thus required to maintain, or at least police, her land often enough 
to promptly spot the improving trespasser. Moreover, by actually 
maintaining her land, the owner might prevent trespassing 
improvements altogether, because it is much harder, and sometimes 
physically impossible, to improve land already improved. For 
example, a trespasser cannot build a structure where one has already 
been built or clear a field that has already been cleared. 
As originally conceived by courts and legislatures, the balancing 
test applied in improving trespasser cases is meant not to impose a 
duty to maintain, but to prevent unjust enrichment. Nonetheless, 
because of the factors used to justify forcing the owner to sell the land 
to the trespasser, the test’s actual effect is the promotion of a duty to 
maintain. 
3. Adverse Possession.  Another doctrine carrying the same effect 
is adverse possession. The impact of adverse possession on an owner 
is more unsettling than that of the improving trespasser rules or the 
eminent-domain power. When losing her land through the latter 
doctrines, the owner is paid its market value, by the trespasser or the 
government, respectively. In contrast, when losing her land through 
adverse possession, the owner receives no compensation. 
For this dire fate to befall an owner, the requirements of adverse 
possession must be met. A person must prove unauthorized, actual, 
exclusive, continuous, and open possession of the owner’s land for a 
statutorily set period of time.312 Unlike improving trespasser rules, 
adverse possession’s focus is not on the value of improvements the 
trespasser made, but rather, on the passage of time.313 However, like 
the improving trespasser doctrine, adverse possession incentivizes an 
owner to maintain her land, as an intruder is likelier to meet the 
requirements of adverse possession, and win the owner’s land, when 
that land is neglected. 
Inevitably, it is easier to actually possess another’s land for a 
lengthy period of time, as required for adverse possession, when that 
land is neglected. In such circumstances, entry barriers to the land 
and detection risks while on the land are lower. The actual-possession 
requirement thus often serves as a proxy singling out neglectful 
 
 312. See, e.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781–82 (Alaska 2000).  
 313. See Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990) (“Whether a claimant’s 
physical acts upon the land are sufficiently continuous, notorious and exclusive does not 
necessarily depend on the existence of significant improvements . . . .”). 
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owners. An owner who could not be bothered to keep intruders off 
her land for the statutory adverse-possession period is unlikely to 
have been actively maintaining it in other respects.314 Adverse 
possession’s further requirement that the intruder’s possession be 
open is particularly geared toward protecting an owner who 
maintains her land: an intruder openly possessing the land is apparent 
to an owner attending to it.315 Moreover, if the owner maintains the 
land, it will often be impossible for the possessor to satisfy the 
adverse-possession requirement of exclusive possession. When the 
owner maintains the land, the intruder cannot argue that she 
excluded the owner. Thus, the intruder’s possession is viewed as 
shared with the owner, rather than exclusive, and the adverse 
possession claim falters.316 In sum, because it requires actual, open, 
and exclusive possession by an intruder, adverse possession 
encourages an owner to maintain her land, or at least periodically 
inspect it, to impede possession by unauthorized individuals. 
4. Nuisance Abatement and Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation 
Statutes.  As with common-law rules inflicting financial liability on 
neglectful owners, the traditional common-law rules exposing these 
owners to potential loss of land are amplified by legislative initiatives. 
The most straightforward of such initiatives are the nuisance-
abatement statutes. As explained in Part II.A, an undermaintained 
property may constitute a public nuisance.317 In common law, the 
sanction accompanying this tort was damages or an injunction. 
Nowadays, plaintiffs may seek yet another remedy set by statute: 
abatement of the nuisance through the taking of the neglected 
property. Courts may order the property sealed and ban the owner 
from using it for one to several years.318 Once that time elapses, the 
 
 314. Peñalver, supra note 28, at 210. 
 315. E.g., Nome, 799 P.2d at 309 (“Use consistent with ownership which gives visible 
evidence of the claimant’s possession, such that the reasonably diligent owner ‘could see that a 
hostile flag was being flown over his property’ is sufficient [to prove notoriety].” (quoting Shilts 
v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977))). 
 316. Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990) (“[T]he adverse claimant’s 
possession cannot be shared with the true owner.” (quoting J.P. HAND & J.C. SMITH, 
NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 6.06, at 135 (1988))). 
 317. See supra Part II.A. 
 318. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3901–3904 (2007 & Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.3825 (West 2013). Individuals seeking nuisance abatement must petition the court and rely 
on a statute. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Holland, 993 N.E.2d 184, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013) (denying claimant’s contention that he enjoys a citizen’s right to abate a nuisance, a right 
which empowered him to take over a vacant house in foreclosure). 
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owner regains title provided she pays all expenses related to the 
abatement of the nuisance. Often, she is also obliged to post a bond 
assuring the nuisance shall not resume.319 Many states limit these 
remedies to cases in which the neglected property is a hub for illegal 
uses, such as gambling, drugs, or prostitution.320 
In a still more recent trend dating to the past decade, some states 
adopted legislation subjecting all neglected properties, not just those 
accommodating illegal activities, to such treatment. For example, the 
Ohio nuisance-abatement statute defines public nuisances as 
including deteriorated buildings, and empowers any interested party 
to petition the court for the appointment of a receiver to abate the 
nuisance.321 The receiver is tasked with maintaining the property, and 
may sell it to fund her efforts.322 Indiana introduced an expedited 
process for the forced tax sale of abandoned properties, which limits 
the right an owner otherwise has to redeem her property.323 Iowa 
represents an even more extreme example. A recent amendment to 
its statutes empowers a city in which an abandoned building is located 
to petition the court to enter judgment awarding the city clean title to 
the property.324 
 
 319. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3904 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3840 (West 
2013).  
 320. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1270 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2013). 
 321. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
 322. Id. 
 323. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4 (LexisNexis 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-1(a)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2013). Indiana also bans certain entities, which are unlikely to develop the 
abandoned lands, from purchasing properties in the tax sale. See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-11-16 
(LexisNexis 2013) (“A person who owes delinquent taxes, special assessments, penalties, 
interest, or costs directly attributable to a prior tax sale on a trace of real property . . . may not 
purchase, receive, or lease a tract that is offered in a sale, exchange, or lease under this 
chapter.”).  
 324. IOWA CODE ANN. § 657A.10A (West Supp. 2014). The special task force appointed by 
the President to explore blight in Detroit recommended that Michigan adopt a similar measure 
to reinforce the city’s power to use nuisance proceedings to demolish blighted properties or take 
title from their owners. See DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, supra note 121. Detroit 
was actually the site of the first such measure in 2005: the Wayne County Nuisance Abatement 
Program (NAP) was empowered to pursue neglectful owners and take title of their property 
through court action. Wayne Cnty. Exec. v. Acorn Inv. Co., Nos. 248925, 248926, 248927, 
248928, 2005 WL 17764, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2005). Though the program was hailed as a 
success, the county discontinued it due to budgetary constraints in 2010. Dustin Walsh, Wayne 
County Wins 11 Awards from National Association of Counties, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (July 
20, 2010), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20100720/free/100729992/wayne-county-wins-11-
awards-from-national-association-of-counties. In April 2014, the newly elected mayor of Detroit 
launched a neighborhood-rebuilding program that seeks to force property owners to 
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Illinois, which similarly enables local governments to gain title 
for abandoned properties,325 has further adopted a supplementary, 
and different, approach to reintegrating undermaintained properties. 
In Illinois, governments are not the only entities now entitled to take 
possession of such properties. The Illinois Abandoned Housing 
Rehabilitation Act empowers nonprofit organizations to petition 
courts for permission to take possession of abandoned properties and 
rehabilitate them for low- or moderate-income housing.326 An owner 
may seek to restore her interest in the property, but she must first 
reimburse the organization for its expenditures and for any increase 
in the property’s value.327 If the owner delays for more than two years, 
she loses the property irreparably.328 
These different statutes enable local governments and nonprofit 
organizations to take over neglected land and maintain it. The owner 
loses, permanently or temporarily, her land or the right to use it. 
Even though she is thereby deprived of her property, none of these 
statutes offer compensation. Although the Constitution mandates 
compensation for the denial of all economically beneficial use of 
private land,329 courts have upheld these arrangements because they 
target nuisances.330 In other words, precisely because the 
 
rehabilitate vacant homes on their properties through the threat of otherwise losing those 
properties to the Detroit Land Bank under nuisance-abatement laws. Detroit’s Neighborhood 
Rebuilding Program Kicks Off in Marygrove Community, CITY OF DETROIT (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/News/tabid/3196/ctl/ReadDefault/mid/4561/ArticleId/445/
Default.aspx. 
 325. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-31-1(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014). 
 326. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 (West 2008). 
 327. Id. § 50/7. 
 328. This is so provided that the nonprofit uses the property for low- or moderate-income 
housing for at least ten years. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/9 (West 2008). In another new law, 
adopted in 2010, Illinois empowers localities to initiate a forced sale of distressed 
condominiums, defined as parcels “containing condominium units which are operated in a 
manner or have conditions which may constitute a danger, blight, or nuisance to the 
surrounding community or to the general public.” 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/14.5 (West 
Supp. 2014). Detroit has experimented with another tactic to promote the rehabilitation of 
vacant properties. In May 2014, the city began auctioning vacant houses it owns at the starting 
price of $1000. Buyers must inhabit the house and commit to repairing it within six months. If 
the house is not up to code within six months, the buyer loses the house (and the money she 
paid for it). See Building Detroit, DETROIT LAND BANK AUTH., http://www.buildingdetroit.org 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).  
 329. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
 330. E.g., Empire State Ins. Co. v. Chafetz, 278 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir.1960) (“The exercise of 
the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance . . . is very 
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without 
due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property 
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arrangements penalize neglectful owners and enforce a duty to 
maintain, they count as legitimate exercises of the state’s police 
power. 
C. Summary: Property Law’s Duty To Maintain and Its Relationship 
to Rights to Destroy and Abandon 
Each of the doctrines reviewed in this Part imposes on an owner 
a duty to maintain her property up to a minimum standard. When a 
statutory duty (for example, an implied warranty of habitability or a 
building code) applies, an owner is subject to a detailed list of 
obligations regarding her property’s condition. In the absence of a 
specific statutory duty, an owner remains subject to the duty to 
maintain as formulated in different common-law rules, which urge her 
to periodically inspect her property, prevent blight, and exercise at 
least a reasonable standard of care to avoid the emergence of 
dangerous conditions or interferences with neighbors’ enjoyment of 
their lands. Each doctrine creates an incentive: maintaining her 
property is an effective (and sometimes the only) way for an owner to 
avoid the imposition of financial liability, or loss of land, by the 
specific doctrine. The intensity and details of the incentive vary across 
doctrines. So does the identity of the party who can seek a remedy 
against the owner under each doctrine. Sometimes it is a harmed 
individual, other times it is any individual or an individual who meets 
certain conditions, and elsewhere it is the relevant local government. 
But the end effect is the same. Cumulatively, these doctrines 
construct a legal reality in which the duty to maintain is pervasive. An 
owner is simply not free to let her land lie fallow or gather dust. Any 
such decision may entail legal costs.  
 
is taken away from an innocent owner.” (quoting Pasternack v. Bennett, 190 So. 56, 59 (Fla. 
1939))); Johnson v. City of Prichard, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319–20 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (finding no 
unconstitutional taking or trespass by the government when a city demolished a structure to 
abate a nuisance); Embassy Realty Invs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 976 F. Supp. 2d 931, 940–43 
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (same); Keshbro v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 875–77 (Fla. 2001) (holding 
that an order of closure issued to a business where illegal activity was taking place pursuant to a 
nuisance-abatement statute, was not a taking); LJD Props., Inc. v. Greenville, 753 S.W.2d 204, 
207 (Tex. App. 1988) (finding no unconstitutional taking or trespass by the government when a 
city demolished a structure to abate a nuisance under the Texas Constitution). These rulings 
rely, or can rely, on statements made by the Supreme Court in cases such as Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n. 20 (1987) (“[S]ince no individual 
has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has 
not ‘taken’ anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.”). 
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This unacknowledged limit on ownership’s reach is different 
from seemingly similar rights an owner may lack to abandon or 
destroy her property. These latter rights have recently attracted 
belated and sophisticated scholarly attention, and it is important to 
understand the differences between the duty to maintain and these 
other elements of property law.331 The difference centers on two 
special characteristics of property law. First, property law employs the 
term “abandonment” in a manner diverging from the word’s 
colloquial understanding. Second, property law does not fold the 
moderate right to neglect an asset into the radical right to destroy it. 
In common parlance respecting assets, the verbs “to abandon” 
and “to neglect” are used interchangeably. In property law, 
conversely, the term “abandonment” has a very precise and 
constricted meaning. An owner does not legally abandon her 
property by neglecting or failing to maintain it. An owner who has 
not occupied her land for a lengthy period of time, or who has 
allowed it to fall into disrepair, has not necessarily abandoned it as a 
legal matter. Legal abandonment requires an actual decision by the 
owner to let go of the property. An owner abandons her property 
when she chooses to no longer be its owner and acts on that 
decision.332 Abandonment thus signifies a mental state of actively 
seeking to renounce one’s status as owner—not a mere disregard of 
the owned asset. 
The law of water rights neatly illustrates this distinction. It 
allocates to individuals rights to use water that can later be lost in two 
distinct ways: abandonment or forfeiture. Water rights are abandoned 
when their owner exhibits intent to relinquish them; water rights are 
forfeited when their owner fails to use them. Ergo, an owner who has 
expressed no intent to relinquish her water rights cannot lose them 
through abandonment, but she might still lose them through 
forfeiture if she fails to maintain them.333 
An owner may fail to maintain her property without abandoning 
it and thus the duty to maintain is not synonymous with the owner’s 
inability to legally abandon land.334 Similarly, the duty to maintain 
 
 331. On the right to abandon, see generally Peñalver, supra note 28; Strahilevitz, supra note 
12. On the right to destroy, see generally Strahilevitz, supra note 28. 
 332. E.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (abandoning 
easements); Corliss v. Wenner, 34 P.3d 1100, 1104 (Idaho App. 2001) (abandoning goods). 
 333. See Hawley v. Kansas, 132 P.3d 870, 880 (Kan. 2006) (relying on the abandonment–
forfeiture distinction). 
 334. In American law, land cannot be abandoned. See supra note 17. 
SHOKED IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN 491 
suggested here is not the equivalent of the lack of a right to destroy. 
Professor Lior Strahilevitz defines destruction as the “eliminat[ion] 
. . . of all otherwise valuable future interests in a . . . thing.”335 
Naturally, as a practical matter, an owner may fail to maintain her 
property without eliminating all its value. More importantly, as a legal 
matter, an owner may have a right to destroy her asset, yet still be 
obliged to maintain it until its destruction. To illustrate this point, 
consider animal law. Under current law, animals are treated as 
property and may be destroyed (that is, put to death) by their owners 
at any point.336 However, an owner is not free to treat her animal 
cruelly, and therefore, is not allowed to starve or neglect it.337 Thus, 
although the owner possesses the freedom to destroy her animal, she 
does not hold the lesser freedom to refrain from maintaining it.338  
The duty to maintain identified in this Article is thus not the 
Hohfeldian opposite,339 or the reverse image, of the privilege to 
destroy. Neither is the failure to abide by this duty to maintain 
comparable to the abandonment of property. The powerful duty to 
maintain emerging from the disparate legal rules reviewed in this Part 
is an independent element of American property law and as such, it 
must be separately appreciated and explained. 
 
 335. Strahilevitz, supra note 28, at 793. 
 336. GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 24, 44, 128–29 (1995) 
(animals are regarded as property and hence may be killed by owners; protective legislation has 
never been interpreted to interfere with the unnecessary killing by owners). 
 337. See The Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1)–(2) (2012). The Animal 
Welfare Act does not prohibit exterminating animals, but bans certain forms of abuse and 
neglect. Id. (mandating that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate rules establishing 
minimum standards for animal welfare including feeding and exercise); see also State v. Hill, 996 
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that although Missouri law does not preclude 
owners from intentionally killing their animals in a humane way, it prohibits them from 
intentionally causing them suffering). 
 338. Doctrines reviewed earlier in this Article also illustrate this special feature of property 
law that extends to the owner the right to destroy her property while subjecting her to a duty to 
maintain it during its existence. Unless it is protected as a historic landmark, a current owner 
can destroy a building she owns. See, e.g., J.C. & Assocs. v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 
A.2d 296, 298 (D.C. 2001) (holding that the petitioner was barred from destroying its building, 
as it was a historical landmark). However, as long as the building stands, the owner is subject to 
the duty to maintain it in accordance with building codes. See supra notes 266–80 and 
accompanying text.  
 339. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). 
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III.  THE NORMATIVE STANDING OF THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN 
Part II showed that American property law currently 
encompasses a duty to maintain. Scholarly claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding, owners have no right to let land lie fallow or gather 
dust. But should they? Is American law’s imposition of a duty to 
maintain justified? What normative values, if any, does the duty 
serve, and how should these values affect our attitude toward the 
specific rules enforcing the duty that were surveyed in the preceding 
Part? 
This Part seeks to answer these questions and demonstrate that 
statements about owners’ freedom to let land lie fallow or gather dust 
are not solely factually inaccurate, as already seen, but also 
normatively unacceptable. This claim appears to challenge Part I’s 
analysis, which highlighted the vital role assigned by the different 
normative justifications for property to the owner’s immunity from 
edicts. But the ensuing examination demonstrates that in actuality, 
the different property justifications presented in Part I not only 
tolerate the duty to maintain, but necessitate it. The discussion in this 
Part concludes by employing this realization to revisit and criticize the 
hostile judicial attitude toward new maintenance ordinances enforced 
against lenders originally presented in Part I. 
But first this Part analyzes each of the normative theories 
discussed in Part I—right-based, utilitarian, and relational—in turn, 
constructing through each a normative account of the duty to 
maintain. The conclusion is that, when correctly understood, each 
theory requires a duty to maintain. Nonetheless, some theories 
require a broader duty than others. Right-based arguments embrace a 
limited duty and hence only some of the legal doctrines surveyed in 
Part II are justifiable in the right-based worldview. Utilitarian 
theories adopt a much broader vision and accordingly justify almost 
all current rules. Relational theories support the widest notion of the 
duty and can justify all the legal practices enforcing it. The theories 
thus have a cumulative ability to explain the doctrines: each theory 
can incorporate the doctrines and explanations provided by the 
theory or theories previously surveyed. 
This relationship between the theories implies that, as is 
inevitable given the natural discrepancy between distinct normative 
theories, not all readers should endorse all the duty’s manifestations 
revealed in Part II. Specifically, right-based theories profess a strong 
individualistic bent, and therefore, approach all property restrictions 
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with a generally dim view.340 Thus, a reader who adheres to a right-
based theory might reject current rules extending the duty to 
maintain beyond the minimalist contours that right-based theories 
outline. Alternatively, that reader might contemplate justifications for 
property drawing on non-right-based arguments: utilitarian or 
relational theories. 
A. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Right-Based 
Property Theories 
1. The Duty To Maintain as Embodying Actual Contracts.  The 
first group of property theories grounded property in its ability to 
promote owners’ individual rights, which, as seen in Part I.A.1, are all 
connected to freedom. In accordance, under these theories, a duty to 
maintain—or any other affirmative duty placed on an owner—is 
justified and must be enforced when the owner freely assumed it of 
her own volition. The move from complete freedom (and isolation)—
the state right-based theories idealize—to a state of obligation, must 
be the result of actual free choice.341 In other words, the duty to 
maintain has to relate to a contract the owner voluntarily entered. 
When it does, property law must aid in implementing this exercise of 
the owner’s freedom of choice—for, under right-based theories, this is 
the law’s function. 
The original contract creating the duty to maintain need not be 
explicit or detailed for the duty’s enforcement to be justifiable in this 
manner under right-based theories. The duty need not be specifically 
written into a formal agreement. The test to determine whether the 
duty expresses the free agreement of the owner is substantive, not 
formal.342 For theories focusing on an individual’s right to freely 
 
 340. For example, right-based arguments would limit nuisance liability to cases in which the 
defendant is perceived as physically invading the plaintiff’s land. Richard Epstein, Nuisance 
Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 57–65 (1979). This 
attitude does not reflect the common law, and it is representative of the inevitable, awkward 
solutions right-based explanations deliver, given the fact that right-holders are surrounded by 
other right-holders. SINGER, supra note 30, at 94, 171–74. 
 341. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–31 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) 
(1690); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 132 (2009). 
 342. A similar attitude justifies a fiduciary’s duty not to let funds in her possession lie fallow. 
This duty is implied into the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship. In re D’Espinay-
Durtal’s Will, 4 A.D.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957). Accordingly, one court suggested that a 
mortgage service company, as the trustee of the investors holding the mortgage, owes the 
investors a fiduciary duty to maintain the underlying property. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of 
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choose, the defining question is whether the owner is fairly viewed as 
choosing a liability—explicitly or implicitly. 
A few of the legal doctrines introduced in Part II as instituting 
the duty to maintain reflect this normative stance. They impose the 
duty on an owner who, in one way or another, is legally conceived as 
choosing to assume it. These are the doctrines of waste, easements, 
affirmative covenants, and support rights. Whereas the first three 
draw on explicit agreements, the final one is grounded in an implicit 
agreement. 
2. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Draw on 
Explicit Contracts.  In the easiest cases for right-based justifications, 
the duty to maintain can be connected to an actual, explicit contract. 
Several of the rules reviewed in Part II fall into this category. The 
duty to maintain enforced through the doctrines of waste and 
easements is traceable to a voluntary agreement by owners, as both 
doctrines are fully contractual. The duty of the present interest holder 
not to commit waste is suppletive in that law imposes the duty, even 
when not included in the original contract creating the estate, as mere 
default. The individuals drafting that contract are free to renounce 
the doctrine: the creator of the present interest can empower its 
holder to commit waste.343 Similarly, after the creation of the interest, 
the holders of the future interests are free at any time to allow the 
holder of the present interest to commit waste.344 The law with respect 
to the maintenance of easements is identical: those establishing an 
easement can agree that the easement’s holder will not be subject to a 
duty to keep it in good repair.345 If the parties to the easement fail to 
 
N.Y. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. HP#115/13, 2013 WL 5336761, at *9 (N.Y. City Civ. 
Ct. Sept. 12, 2013). Similarly, a condominium board owes the owners of the individual units a 
fiduciary duty, statutorily or otherwise, read into the declaration establishing the condominium, 
to provide for the operation, care, upkeep, maintenance, replacement, and improvement of the 
common elements. E.g., Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 981 N.E.2d 1069, 1075–76 
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2012) (holding the condominium board liable for breach of its fiduciary duty 
when it failed to make repairs to the common elements that were causing damage to an 
individual unit). 
 343. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 637, at 682 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan 
eds., 1968). An exception exists in California, where a statute bars a mortgagor from committing 
waste, regardless of the agreement. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929 (West 2012). 
 344. See Thomas Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in 
American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1086 (2011) (“[C]ontractual modifications of 
duties toward specific property can be and often are modified [after the creation of the 
interest].”). 
 345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.13 (2000). 
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renounce the duty at that point or later, the law simply assumes they 
agreed to impose it.346 
Affirmative covenants are also contractual in nature. A duty to 
maintain embodied in a covenant is a duty that two private parties—
in most cases, adjacent owners—established in an agreement between 
them. That agreement then runs with the land—hence it is not a mere 
contract right, but a property right.347 The agreement can be enforced 
against, and by, future owners of the lands—who were not parties to 
the original agreement. However, such future owners are legally 
viewed as if they did voluntarily consent to the duty contained in the 
original agreement. After all, they chose to buy the land knowing that 
it was subject to the covenant.348 The law of covenants verifies that the 
current owner tacitly agreed to the previously created covenant by 
mandating that she have notice of it.349 Hence, as with the rules 
respecting waste and the maintenance of easements, affirmative 
covenants are grounded in a contract an owner actually and freely 
entered, and accordingly, they must be enforced under a right-based 
theory of property. 
3. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Draw on 
Implicit Contracts.  The duty to maintain embodied in the law of 
support rights, albeit not rooted in any explicit agreement—unlike 
duties in waste, easements, and affirmative covenants—is based on an 
implicit agreement. Thus it too imposes a duty to maintain that is 
grounded in an owner’s free choice. An owner has a duty to maintain 
a retaining wall supporting neighboring land because in most cases 
she or her predecessor built that wall as a replacement for the natural 
support furnished to the neighbor’s land.350 The owner who 
constructed the wall made a choice and an exchange: she chose to 
 
 346. See Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1982); 2 G. THOMPSON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 428, at 666 (1980 Replacement).  
 347. SINGER, supra note 102, at 848.  
 348. For a libertarian writer celebrating restrictions imposed on owners through covenants 
in a planned community, see RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 43, 69–
75 (2004).  
 349. Although historically notice was required for covenants’ enforcement in equity but not 
in law, courts now tend to require it in all cases. E.g., Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 
736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987). In addition, recording statutes protect buyers from servitudes 
of which they had no notice. E.g., 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 351 (West 2001).  
 350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817, cmt. k (1979) (“The [excavating] actor may 
avoid liability by furnishing artificial support, such as a retaining wall, sufficient to replace the 
natural lateral support withdrawn.”). 
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remove the natural support provided to her neighbor’s soil, and 
tacitly agreed that instead of being liable for that act, she would 
provide her neighbor with a wall performing the function formerly 
provided by the unexcavated land. Later, if a subsequent buyer of the 
land on which the wall stands saw the wall, that buyer would be put 
on notice of that exchange. If the buyer did not actually see the 
retaining wall, but could have seen it, she was still on constructive 
notice of the exchange. Either way, the subsequent buyer implicitly 
agreed to the conditions of the exchange when buying the land.351 
According to right-based arguments for property, this and all other 
agreed-upon duties to maintain—found in waste, easements, and the 
law of covenants—must be enforced as they evince the owner’s 
freedom and right to choose. 
B. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Utilitarian 
Property Theories 
1. The Duty To Maintain as Embodying a Hypothetical Contract.  
Right-based theories explain a few doctrines applying the duty to 
maintain by tying those doctrines to an actual contract an owner 
freely entered. The other doctrines identified in Part II that impose a 
duty to maintain cannot be justified in contractual terms, and thus 
cannot easily pass muster with right-based theories.352 Most of these 
other doctrines, however, are outgrowths of utilitarian theories, which 
view these doctrines as reflecting a hypothetical contract that is 
necessary for the promotion of utility. The reason is that an owner’s 
decision to not maintain her land generates effects on others, effects 
that she does not consider through contractual agreements with those 
others due to transaction costs. The doctrines imposing the duty to 
maintain embody a hypothetical agreement replacing this 
 
 351. This rationale was explicitly stated in the Canadian case, Foster v. Brown, 48 O.L.R. 1, 
6 (Can. Ont. App. Div. 1920), which set the rule respecting the duty to maintain retaining walls 
that was later adopted by American courts in Gorton v. Schofield, 41 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 
1942). The Canadian court reasoned that the current owner is liable for failing to maintain a 
retaining wall built by her predecessor, but she was not liable for excavations performed by that 
predecessor. Id. at 6–7. As in the former case, the court reasoned that she was aware, when she 
bought the land, of the duty toward the neighbor. Id. at 3–4. 
 352. Right-based arguments might justify all other manifestations of the duty to maintain 
based on an idea of “harm.” See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Because a neglectful 
owner exercises her right in a manner that imposes harms on others, she is interfering with their 
rights. But, because this account requires a definition of rights and harm that does not draw on 
freedom, but rather relies on utilitarian or relational descriptions of property, it caricatures 
right-based explanations and renders them meaningless as an independent category. 
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unreachable actual agreement and are thus the only way to assure 
that the owner’s decision respecting land maintenance is socially 
beneficial—as required by the utilitarian justification for property. 
The analysis in this Section unpacks the different elements of this 
claim. 
As seen in Part I.A.2, utilitarian theories enshrine the owner’s 
free decisions regarding the use and maintenance of her land as the 
owner experiences the decisions’ costs and benefits, and therefore is 
the most likely to make socially efficient decisions. Naturally this 
prediction only holds if the owner’s decision does not generate costs 
or benefits not experienced by the owner—effects on surrounding 
lands.353 Unfortunately, an owner’s decision to neglect her land almost 
inevitably carries such external costs. The costs outsiders feel may be 
quite extreme. As the task force appointed by the President to aid the 
city of Detroit explained in the spring of 2014 when detailing the 
rationale behind its arduous endeavor to map each and every 
neglected property in the city, “[b]light is a cancer. Blight sucks the 
soul out of anyone who gets near it, let alone those who are 
unfortunate enough to live with it all around them. Blight is 
radioactive.”354 
A blighted, or even simply ill-maintained, property impacts its 
neighbors in many ways.355 It causes aesthetic damages,356 as it is likely 
to be an eyesore. It may cause physical damages as, for example, trees 
can fall onto neighboring land, fires can spread more easily, and 
dangerous entrants are attracted to the area.357 It also causes financial 
 
 353. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 146, at 49. 
 354. DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, supra note 121, at preface.  
 355. One study found that the presence of an abandoned house on a block reduces the value 
of all the other property by an average of $6720. RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, BLIGHT FREE 
PHILADELPHIA: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE STRATEGY TO CREATE AND ENHANCE NEIGHBORHOOD 
VALUE 21 (2001).  
 356. NAT’L VACANT PROPS. CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COSTS TO 
COMMUNITIES 11 (2005), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-
costs.pdf (noting the various costs of vacant properties to communities including increased city 
services, decreased property values, low quality of life for homeowners, and blight). 
 357. See supra notes 155–65 and accompanying text; see also Alan Mallach, Abandoned 
Property: Effective Strategies to Reclaim Community Assets, HOUSING FACTS & FINDINGS: 
SHARING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, Vol. 6, 
No. 2 at 6 (Fannie Mae Foundation 2004) (“The National Fire Protection Agency reports that in 
1999, an estimated 11,400 structure fires in vacant properties caused 24 civilian deaths, 66 
civilian injuries, and $131.5 million in direct property damage.”); William Spelman, Abandoned 
Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 485 (1993) (“Blocks [in Austin, Texas] with 
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effects as the value of surrounding properties is depressed,358 local 
revenue from property tax decreases,359 and extended public services, 
such as policing and fire prevention, become required.360 The owner of 
the property does not experience these costs herself, and hence, will 
often not take them into account in her decision to neglect.361  
Yet even when externalities are present, as they are here, the 
utilitarian prediction that the owner’s decision respecting the use of 
her land will produce socially efficient outcomes can persist. 
According to traditional utilitarian analysis, the owner will still act 
efficiently if the outsiders experiencing the externalities bargain with 
the owner and force her to internalize the externalities into her 
decision.362 An owner will, for instance, consider her decision’s effects 
on others if they pay her to do so. Property law established a tool for 
effectuating such contracts by which outsiders make sure that the 
owner internalizes the effects her decisions have on them. That tool is 
the covenant. A covenant, such as the affirmative covenants reviewed 
earlier, is a promise outsiders procure through bargaining whereby an 
owner pledges that she and her successors will refrain from activities 
those outsiders find detrimental. Covenants further enable founding 
collective neighborhood bodies—homeowners associations and 
 
unsecured buildings had 3.2 times as many drug calls [to police], 1.8 times as many theft calls [to 
police], and twice the number of violent calls [to police]” as other blocks).  
 358. Anne Shlay & Gordon Whitman, Research for Democracy: Linking Community 
Organizing and Research to Leverage Blight Policy, 5 CITY & CMTY. J. 153, 162 (2006) (finding 
that Philadelphia homes within 450 feet of an abandoned property suffered a net decrease in 
sales price of between $3542 and $7627). 
 359. Edward G. Goetz, Kristin Cooper, Bret Thiele & Hin Kin Lam, Pay Now or Pay More 
Later: St. Paul’s Experience in Rehabilitating Vacant Housing, CURA REP. 19 (Apr. 1998) 
(calculating the decrease in St. Paul, Minnesota’s tax revenue attributable to declining values of 
properties surrounding undermaintained lots). 
 360. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34, VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING 
NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES 42–43 (2011). For example, it is 
estimated that foreclosed and undermaintained properties cost Chicago $36 million in 
maintenance, security, and administrative costs annually. Dory Rand, Op-Ed., Chicago’s 
Housing Recovery Just Got Slower, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Sep. 4, 2013, http://www.
chicagobusiness.com/article/20130904/OPINION/130909977/chicagos-housing-recovery-just-got-
slower (reporting the finding of a study conducted by the Woodstock Institute). 
 361. To the extent these harms do not always materialize, it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that neglect is a risk-producing activity, or omission, operating at a scale that does not match the 
size or shape of individually owned pieces of property. See Lee Ann Fennell, Property and Half-
Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1448 (2007).  
 362. The argument was famously laid out in Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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condominiums363—to enforce these promises and to verify that owners 
do not engage in behaviors negatively affecting others.364 Indeed, the 
extraordinary spread of homeowners associations and condominiums 
during the second half of the twentieth century365 is attributable to the 
need of American owners, living in an increasingly crowded 
environment, for assurances that the surrounding properties would 
remain well maintained.366 
This development is hardly surprising. Due to the major 
externalities generated whenever a property is neglected, all owners 
stand to gain if each takes these effects into account before settling on 
a level of maintenance for her property. We should therefore expect 
all owners to enter neighborhood agreements in which each assures 
her peers that she will maintain her property. Yet despite the promise 
of social-welfare gains afforded by homeowners associations and 
condominiums, most properties are not subject to them or to 
covenants requiring maintenance. The culprit is the major transaction 
costs involved in instituting covenants in existing neighborhoods. 
Bargaining, as already noted, generally leads to the internalization of 
externalities; however, and as is established in economic literature, in 
any given case such bargaining may fail to materialize due to 
transaction costs.367 Among other things, the individuals affected by a 
property owner’s decision may be too dispersed to come together to 
negotiate with her, the decision’s effects on any one individual may be 
too limited to impel her to alone expend the resources for 
negotiations, a forum for negotiations may be lacking, and 
antagonism may separate the parties. 
A multitude of such transaction costs impede contracts—or, 
more accurately, covenants—from forcing the owner to internalize 
the effects of neglect. To subject owners to covenants and to an 
 
 363. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000) (defining common-
interest communities and their role). 
 364. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 
1060, 1073 (N.J. 2007) (explaining that homeowners association rules are premised on the 
notion that their reciprocal nature benefits the entire community). 
 365. As of 2012, 323,600 association-governed communities existed in the United States, 
housing 63.4 million Americans in 25.9 million units. In 1970, only 10,000 such communities 
were in existence, with 2.1 million residents in 701,000 units. See FOUNDATION FOR 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION RESEARCH, STATISTICAL REVIEW 2012, available at http://www.
cairf.org/foundationstatsbrochure.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 366. For a similar explanation of such communities’ appeal, see Robert Ellickson, New 
Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 82–83 (1998). 
 367. See generally Coase, supra note 362 (describing this effect). 
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attendant homeowners association or condominium, the assent of all 
owners must normally be obtained. In addition to the major 
administrative costs associated with this endeavor, it is plagued by 
inescapable collective-action problems.368 Any owner who knows she 
is likely to cease maintaining her property will hold out. Moreover, all 
owners have an incentive to not enter the covenant, which places a 
burden of maintenance on them, and stand back as their neighbors 
enter the covenant. Given that those neighbors will now maintain 
their lands, the recalcitrant adjacent owner who did not enter the 
agreement will benefit from the agreement just as much as those who 
did, without sharing in the costs. In other words, on the one hand, all 
surrounding owners benefit from the enforcement of a promise to 
maintain a neighbor’s land and none can be excluded from enjoying 
this benefit. On the other hand, enforcement is costly for an owner. 
The result is that all owners have an incentive to hold out while 
others agree, and thus, no covenant will be created.369 Their appeal 
notwithstanding, reciprocal neighborhood contracts imposing a duty 
to maintain are almost exclusively therefore a phenomenon reserved 
to new developments in which one owner, the developer, owns all 
lands, and thus no administrative costs or collective-action problems 
impede the drafting of covenants.370 
According to a utilitarian analysis, when transaction costs block 
market mechanisms from leading the owner to internalize 
externalities into her free decision, as they do in the case of neglectful 
owners, legal intervention forcing internalization is warranted.371 The 
legal duty to maintain performs that function. It serves the utility-
promoting role of property when it fixes the market failure: creating 
for owners in all neighborhoods, including existing neighborhoods, 
the neighborhood contract that those owners desire but cannot reach 
due to transaction costs. The duty to maintain is thus justifiable as a 
hypothetical contract that promotes utility. 
Most doctrines reviewed in Part II and not justified in reference 
to an actual agreement in Part III.A replace an agreement for 
internalizing externalities that parties would have thrashed out had 
 
 368. See Robert Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 
(1999) (lamenting the inevitability of collective-action problems). 
 369. For a similar argument, see Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 156 (1978). 
 370. Nelson, supra note 368, at 828. 
 371. Peñalver, supra note 70, at 871; see EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 63 (describing how this 
rationale affected the evolution of property laws governing the hunting of wild animals). 
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transaction costs not been present.372 Accordingly they are 
endogenous to property in its utilitarian reading. Whether directly or 
indirectly, these doctrines set in place a reciprocally advantageous 
regime between neighbors, assuring that each internalizes all costs of 
her decision not to maintain. Negligence duties toward outsiders, and 
the laws of private and public nuisance achieve this goal directly. The 
doctrines of eminent domain, building codes, negligence liability 
toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and adverse possession do 
so indirectly. 
2. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Directly 
Institute the Hypothetical Contract.  Some doctrines enforcing the duty 
to maintain are formally set to protect neighbors against the external 
effects of an owner’s act, and thus, they are easily perceived and 
justified as imposing the hypothetical, mutually beneficial, 
neighborhood-maintenance agreement. Negligence duties toward 
outsiders explicitly protect neighbors from physical harms that are 
neglect’s externalities. As one court stated, “the governing principle” 
over the duties of an owner in negligence (as opposed to nuisance), 
“is that one must so use his own property as not to injure that of his 
neighbor.”373 For example, the duty to prevent conditions aiding in the 
spread of fire directly safeguards neighboring properties,374 and the 
liability imposed on an owner for the acts of third parties forces an 
owner to exercise her control over entrants to her land to protect her 
neighbors.375 
For its part, nuisance is specifically defined as an interference 
with neighbors’ enjoyment and use of their land.376 It is a tort regime 
forcing owners to internalize the neighborhood costs of their land-use 
decisions, thereby assuring efficient uses. It is thus directly set to 
replace the contractual neighborhood-land-use regime that 
 
 372. This underlying justification is sometimes explicit. Thus, for example, Madison, 
Wisconsin’s lawn ordinance, requiring all landowners to not allow their lawns to exceed eight 
inches in height, enables an owner to have a “natural lawn”: a lawn for which this restriction 
does not apply. However, to have a natural lawn, the landowner must obtain a special permit, 
which is granted only if a majority of neighborhood owners do not object. MADISON, WIS., 
ORDINANCE § 27.05(2)(f)(5). 
 373. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 109 A. 653, 656 (Pa. 1920). 
 374. See Hesse v. Century Home Components, 514 P.2d 871, 873 (Or. 1973). 
 375. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 356 (4th ed. 1971). 
 376. See supra note 204.  
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transaction costs forestall.377 The tort is sometimes explicitly viewed in 
these terms. Michigan Community Resources and the Michigan 
Municipal League, for example, developed in 2011 a nuisance-based 
legal program to help communities in Detroit hold their members 
responsible for the harms they inflict on local morale and property 
values through neglect. Neighborhood groups can gather information 
on neglectful owners in their midst and report them to a nonprofit 
legal organization that then files nuisance claims against the owners.378 
This role of the nuisance tort, as preserver of common neighborhood 
interests, is even more pronounced in the law of public nuisances. As 
one court explained, the doctrine of public nuisance “aim[s] at the 
protection and redress of community interests and, at least in theory, 
embodies a kind of collective ideal of civil life.”379 
3. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Indirectly 
Institute the Hypothetical Contract.  The negligence and nuisance rules 
just reviewed directly institute a legally constructed, mutually 
beneficial, neighborhood agreement replacing the actual agreement 
for internalizing costs that neighbors cannot negotiate themselves. 
The doctrines of eminent domain, building codes, negligence liability 
toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and adverse possession 
achieve the same socially desirable goal indirectly. Unlike the 
negligence and nuisance doctrines already reviewed, these doctrines 
formally balance the interests of the owner and actors other than her 
neighbors—namely, the government or entrants to her land. Still, 
their actual focus is mostly on protecting neighbors by incentivizing 
the owner to maintain. Thereby, these doctrines are also mechanisms 
for instituting the hypothetical, mutually beneficial, neighborhood 
maintenance agreement. 
This is easiest to see in eminent domain and building codes. The 
governmental exercise of the eminent-domain power is often tailored 
to protect surrounding properties from blight’s effects.380 Building 
 
 377. Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land 
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 762 (1973). 
 378. For more information, see MICH. MUN. LEAGUE, Community Driven Nuisance 
Abatement, available at http://placemaking.mml.org/community-driven-nuisance-abatement/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).  
 379. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997). 
 380. Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1883 (2007) (“Why might condemning blighted property . . . be acceptable, whereas 
condemning non-blighted property is not? . . . [B]ecause the owner of blighted property is 
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codes serve a similar purpose, as legislators admitted in the post-2008 
recession years.381 Indeed, neighboring property owners are often 
those responsible for the city’s eventual action against properties that 
are in violation of the code,382 and a few statutes explicitly allow 
neighbors to independently pursue legal action against a code 
violator.383 
The indirect way in which liability toward trespassers, adverse 
possession, and improving trespasser doctrines indirectly replace a 
mutually beneficial, reciprocal promise to maintain made between 
neighbors, is less conspicuous and requires some elucidation. Liability 
toward trespassers is technically geared toward forcing an owner to 
internalize costs experienced by entrants to her land. But it mostly 
benefits neighbors of the land by incentivizing an owner to eradicate 
dangerous conditions or make her land inaccessible, thereby 
eliminating externalities neighbors would otherwise experience. It 
also benefits neighbors slightly more directly. Trespassers are most 
likely to be neighbors—especially neighboring children attracted to 
the “attractive nuisance.”384 Furthermore, liability frequently hinges 
on others’ vicinity in that no other factor more easily renders the 
trespasser foreseeable, and thus eligible for protection. For example, 
trespassers were foreseeable when a furrow was in a lot abutting a 
school,385 when land served as recreational grounds for neighbors,386 
and when a railroad was situated amid a populated area and residents 
routinely walked along it.387 The practical result of such holdings is 
that negligence liability toward trespassers is likelier when neighbors 
are prone to be affected by the owner’s neglect—that is, when neglect 
 
imposing harm on neighboring properties. The taking of blighted property, therefore, can serve 
as an appropriate collective response to harm-causing or immoral behavior . . . .”). 
 381. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3(b) (West 2012); MADISON, WIS., ORDINANCE 
§ 27.05(2)(f) (requiring owners to maintain their property in a way that will enhance “the 
appearance and value of the neighborhood”). 
 382. For example, consider the facts in DMK Acquisitions & Props. v. New Orleans, 124 So. 
3d 1157, 1162 (La. Ct. App. 2013). Here, community members complained to the city about the 
undermaintained house, and later provided testimony in court regarding multiple code 
violations. Id.  
 383. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-31-1(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014) (awarding the right 
to institute an action to those residing within 1200 feet of the building). 
 384. E.g., Bransom’s Adm’r v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 643 (1884). 
 385. Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A.2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1953). 
 386. Webster v. Culbertson, 761 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. 1988); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 
136 A.2d 887, 894–95 (N.J. 1957).  
 387. First Nat’l Bank v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 865 S.W.2d 719, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
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produces externalities they feel—and thus it is in these situations that 
an owner is incentivized to maintain her land. 
Improving trespasser and adverse possession rules, which 
formally serve the interests of possessors, not neighbors, similarly 
incentivize the owner who seeks immunity from such possessors to 
exercise her title by maintaining the property, thereby sparing 
neighbors from costs. Indeed, throughout their history, these 
doctrines often targeted neglected lands and absentee owners for 
particularly harsh treatment.388 If the incentive these doctrines provide 
to owners to maintain their land, and thereby safeguard the interests 
of neighbors, proves ineffective, the doctrines can force transfer of 
title to the possessor who maintains the land. This is often a neighbor 
who actually maintained the land or constructed something on it.389 
But even if title shifts to a stranger who maintained the previously 
neglected land, neighbors stand to benefit from improved upkeep by 
the new owner. 
Adverse possession in particular is a radical legal doctrine 
“specifying procedures for a productive user to take title from an 
unproductive user.”390 Perhaps the best way to explain in utilitarian 
terms the need for these procedures is to acknowledge their benefits 
to neighbors. Otherwise, it is hard to legitimize the necessity to 
bypass market tools through which the productive (or maintaining) 
user should have entered a purchase agreement with the 
unproductive user-owner.391 This Article’s reconceptualization of 
adverse possession as part of the duty to maintain may help in solving 
this puzzle. The reason an actual agreement between the formal 
owner and the possessor is not reached, despite its social benefits, is 
that the benefit of maintaining the land is not fully experienced by the 
 
 388. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011) 
(explaining that the rationale for protecting improving trespassers has historically been the 
promotion of the active use of neglected lands); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1110–13 (2007) (reporting jurisdictions that directly penalized 
absentee owners, making it easier for squatters to adversely possess undeveloped lands). 
 389. SINGER, supra note 102, at 163 (“[M]ost disputes covered by the law of adverse 
possession are border disputes . . . .”). 
 390. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 154 (5th ed. 2007). 
 391. See Fennell, supra note 10, at 1073–76 (noting the problem, and suggesting that the only 
way for adverse possession law to promote efficiency is by requiring that the user have acted in 
bad faith); Stewart Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81–82 
(1987) (theorizing that an improver’s failure to negotiate the purchase of the land from an 
owner provides evidence that the owner has a higher valuation of the land than the improver).  
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adverse possessor—it is felt by the entire neighborhood.392 
Consequently the adverse possessor does not offer the owner a price 
representing the full benefit of transferring the land to her.393 To 
overcome these transaction costs and compel the internalization of 
maintenance’s benefits, adverse possession forces the land’s transfer 
to the maintaining possessor. 
Adverse possession thus finds a strong justification as a 
mechanism replacing the unattainable, mutually beneficial, 
neighborhood contract to maintain all lands. Along with eminent 
domain, building codes, liability toward trespassers, and improving 
trespasser, this doctrine, although formally pursuing other purposes, 
imposes a duty to maintain that indirectly leads owners to internalize 
the neighborhood costs of their land-use decisions. As with the other 
doctrines instituting the hypothetical neighborhood contract to 
maintain, adverse possession is thus an element of an efficient 
property law system. 
4. The Scope of the Hypothetical Contract.  The utilitarian 
property theory, animating the doctrines just reviewed, demands that 
decisions regarding the use of resources engender efficient results. 
For that purpose, the costs of neglect experienced by others must be 
imposed on the owner who otherwise, due to the inadequacy of 
contractual tools, ignores them. This utilitarian rationale, as seen so 
far, accounts for the reach of the duty to maintain in property law. It 
also explains the duty’s outer limit. 
Given that the legal imposition of costs through the duty to 
maintain is justified in utilitarian terms as a hypothetical contract 
replacing the actual contract parties would have entered, the duty 
only encompasses costs parties inarguably experience, and undeniably 
 
 392. Of course the incentive of a possessor, who knows she does not own the land, to 
maintain it for her benefit and for that of the neighborhood, is to some extent always blunted by 
the owner’s ability to bring an ejection suit before the limitation period runs out. Such a suit will 
be accepted unless the possessor prevails under the flexible, and hence unpredictable, doctrine 
of improving trespasser. 
 393. The transaction costs cited as blocking a deal between the possessor and the true owner 
are associated with the inability of the possessor to identify and locate a true owner who is 
passive, and presumably absent. E.g. Thomas Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130–31 (1984). Minimum maintenance of the land 
or other acts on it serves as a signal aiding potential market players in identifying the owner. 
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79–81 (1985). This 
argument is not as compelling as the one suggested in this Article because the true owner is, by 
definition, the record owner, who can be located through a simple title search, and hence, 
identification costs are unlikely to form the main cause for the market failure. 
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would like to see controlled. The doctrines imposing the duty are 
therefore minimal. They limit their range to actual neglect or 
disregard, which, as explained, inevitably generates objective 
externalities that neighbors feel. These doctrines create a duty to 
maintain property, not to beautify property. The law forbids the 
owner from neglecting her land, but does not prevent her from 
turning it ugly. “It is generally recognized that unsightliness, without 
more, does not create an actionable [claim].”394 Even when the 
aesthetic impact of unsightliness decreases the value of neighboring 
properties, a claim in law does not materialize.395 An added element—
such as objective neglect—must be present. 
Neglect is inherently different from unsightliness. Preferences 
respecting aesthetics are subjective, and thus, as courts explain, the 
regulation of aesthetic harms and benefits should be left to actual, not 
hypothetical, contracts between neighbors. In other words, it should 
be left to covenants. When neighbors challenge an owner’s design 
choice that did not breach a contract between them, the court is asked 
to act as an arbiter of taste, a role generating great confusion.396 
Conversely, when an owner’s choice to neglect her property is 
challenged, and the neglect results in odors, noise, dangerous 
conditions, et cetera, the court is not asked to arbitrate subjective 
tastes. As harms are uncontestable, the court can establish a rather 
predictable and consensual standard by which all owners must abide. 
In these cases, courts can more easily substitute their own judgment 
for the judgment of the parties that would have been expressed in an 
agreement had transaction costs been absent.397 
In utilitarian analysis, property law should do exactly that. It 
should intervene to rectify market failures when private decisions do 
not take full account of social costs and benefits. It should replace 
actual agreements interest-holders desire but cannot attain due to 
hurdles that block bargaining. The duty to maintain performs this 
 
 394. Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 1–2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also Haehlen v. Wilson, 54 
P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. 1984); Jillson v. 
Barton, 229 S.E.2d 476, 477–78 (1975). 
 395. Rankin v. FPL Energy, 266 S.W.3d 506, 510–12 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 396. Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973); Wernke v. Halas, 600 
N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).  
 397. See Parkersburg Builders Material v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (1937) (“[E]quity 
should not be aroused to action merely on the basis of the fastidiousness of taste of 
complainants. Equity should act only where there is presented a situation which is offensive to 
the view of the average persons of the community.”). 
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function in many of its disparate manifestations reviewed in Part II 
and analyzed here, namely, negligence duties toward outsiders, 
private and public nuisance, eminent domain, building codes, 
negligence liability toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and 
adverse possession. The duty to maintain materializes as the only 
legal mechanism capable of instituting the desired mutual assurance 
between neighbors that they will all maintain their lands so as not to 
suffer the neighborhood effects of an owner’s decision to neglect. 
C. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Relational 
Property Theories 
By replacing actual contracts with hypothetical ones as 
justification for a duty to maintain, utilitarian explanations account 
for most of the doctrines reviewed in Part II, whose logic eluded 
right-based explanations. However, one doctrine reviewed in Part II 
explicitly supersedes contracts parties create, and thus cannot be 
viewed as emanating from an agreement they would have freely 
reached had transaction costs been absent. Rules applying the duty in 
landlord–tenant law unequivocally announce their goal to circumvent 
owners’ desires and to promote the interests of one group of 
individuals (tenants) at the expense of another (landlords). These 
rules are not based on the reciprocity-of-advantages idea that 
animates rules protecting neighbors. There, as seen, the duty to 
maintain was based on the assumption that if assured their neighbors 
will do the same, all owners will prefer to maintain their lands. Here 
the assumption is the opposite: in all conditions, all owners who are 
landlords will prefer to be free to neglect. 
Current law still enforces on owners who are landlords a duty to 
maintain, which can only be explained through the third group of 
property theories: relational theories. Although these theories place a 
premium on the owner’s freedom and self-determination achieved 
through ownership, they do so as part of their celebration of desirable 
social relationships. Consequently, like the utilitarian theories, they 
embrace duties to maintain that subject an owner to reciprocal 
obligations toward other owners that sustain the healthy, neighborly 
relations that permit all owners to enjoy their property and flourish, 
free of neglect’s threat. 
But relational justifications go beyond utilitarian justifications. 
Due to the belief that property must sustain desirable relationships, 
as reviewed in Part I.A.3, relational theories value the expansion of 
opportunities for self-determination, even at the expense of existing 
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owners’ liberty or of overall social welfare. Therefore, relational 
theories sometimes require owners to surrender portions of their 
freedom not to mutually benefit other owners with whom they 
entertain a relationship based on equality and reciprocity (such as 
neighbors), but to enable non-owners to enjoy the freedom property 
affords. A particularly compelling reason under relational theories to 
force an owner to part ways with some of her freedom in favor of 
another’s emerges when two conditions are met: the owner is in a 
relationship with another interest-holder who is dependent on her,398 
and the owner voluntarily entered this relationship.399 
Because relational theories focus on desirable and fair 
relationships, they require property law to protect the limited 
freedom of those who, through property relationships, are 
economically dependent on other owners.400 If the latter choose to use 
the property system to establish a position from which they derive a 
benefit from the weakness and dependence of others, property law 
may—and should—limit their freedom to abuse the relationship.401 
The quintessential example for such a relationship of dependence is 
the landlord–tenant relationship.402 The landlord is the property-
holder and thus the stronger actor, whereas the tenant depends on 
her for shelter. Given that the landlord was never forced to become a 
landlord, but rather opted to enter the housing market in quest of 
profits, it is just to force her to provide a well-maintained shelter and 
 
 398. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 75, at 771. 
 399. Singer, supra note 98, at 666–67 (explaining that “[i]t is morally wrong for the true 
owner to allow a relationship of dependence to be established and then to cut off the dependent 
party,” and therefore, adverse possession is justifiable). Peñalver & Alexander, supra note 341, 
at 149–54 (employing a similar framework to analyze State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 
1971)).  
 400. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 80–81 (1983) 
(explaining that relations of interdependence create duties in private law). 
 401. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the 
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (1986) (“[P]rivate law is a 
relatively seamless area in which the society, speaking primarily through the courts, assigns 
rights and duties based on relationships among people and firms, in light of many factors, 
among them the particular community needs, the needs of the parties themselves, their relative 
power, fairness among them and their assent.” (footnote omitted)); see also Bruce Ackerman, 
Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1171 (1971) 
(raising the issue of whether slum landlords must carry special redistributive burdens with 
respect to their tenants). 
 402. Ackerman, supra note 401, at 1172 (arguing that landlords should be subject to the 
warranty of habitability because they chose to embark on a continuing relationship with tenants, 
thereby weaving the maldistribution of income into the fabric of their lives and market 
activities).  
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to conserve the relationship with the specific tenant who depends on 
her. Only in this manner can the tenant’s freedom be protected. It is 
only by imposing a duty to maintain on those who choose to benefit 
from others’ dependence that property can contribute to forming and 
sustaining the social relations necessary for human flourishing. 
D. Summary: Revisiting the Debate over Lenders’ Responsibilities 
The claim that ownership encompasses the right to let land lie 
fallow or gather dust is not merely descriptive, but also normative. As 
seen in Part I, all property theories agree that private property was 
instituted to promote freedom. How can the owner thus be denied the 
most basic freedom, that of choosing to do nothing? How can she be 
forced to act? This Part has shown, however, that in fact all property 
justifications require, for different reasons and to varying extents, that 
ownership place on the owner a duty to maintain, which limits her 
freedom. Right-based theories require the enforcement of a duty 
when current or antecedent owners have entered an agreement that 
can be interpreted as imposing it. Utilitarian theories require the duty 
even in the absence of an agreement if an agreement would have 
been reached had transaction costs not been present. Relational 
theories require the duty even in the absence of an actual or 
hypothetical agreement when the relationship between the parties is 
grounded in an imbalance of power utilized by the stronger party to 
derive an economic benefit and further limit the dependent party’s 
freedom. In light of one or more of these justifications, all current 
doctrines imposing the duty to maintain, reviewed in Part II, are 
warranted. An owner not only lacks the freedom to let her land lie 
fallow or gather dust, she should lack it. The adherents of different 
property theories will dispute the details of the specific limits placed 
on that freedom, but none should question the desirability of limits. 
This conclusion aids in rethinking the prevailing, and generally 
dismissive, attitude toward affirmative obligations in property law 
and the embrace of the trope that an owner has a right to let land lie 
fallow or gather dust, presented in Part I. It should also serve to 
remedy specific detrimental effects of that trope. The new 
understanding of the doctrinal place occupied by the duty to maintain 
in American law, and of the duty’s normative function, should inform 
legislators and judges as they tackle new questions in property law. 
As an example of the practical implications of the theoretical findings 
elaborated on in this Part, these concluding pages will revisit the 
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hostile approach of contemporary courts to new maintenance 
obligations enforced against lenders. 
As surveyed in Part I.D, this attitude owes to a belief that 
holders of interests in property enjoy the freedom to ignore that 
property. Yet, as Part II of this Article illustrated by exposing the 
profusion of property rules enforcing a duty to maintain, the common 
law contains no such freedom. The disapproving attitude toward new 
statutory duties imposed on lien holders over neglected properties 
stands in stark contrast to the realities of American law. These 
realities are not new, but have been a constant in American law. As 
seen in Part I.C, affirmative duties in property law are often 
disfavored, as they are conceived as feudal practices alien to liberal 
Anglo-American law. In fact, however, as Part II revealed, such 
duties have always formed a key element in liberal Anglo-American 
law. 
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that throughout American 
history, legislative initiatives were embraced to reinforce the capacity 
of the duty to maintain to combat specific ills—similar to those 
targeted today by measures directed at lenders—as they periodically 
emerged. As soon as colonization commenced, American law 
required owners to work and improve their lands, appropriating the 
land if they did not. These early laws explicitly referred to the social 
harms that deserted lands could generate.403 Other laws enacted at the 
time required owners to fence their lands, and appointed “fence 
watchers” to enforce compliance through fines and other sanctions 
against those who failed to thereby secure their lands or allowed 
fences to fall into disrepair.404 Later, nineteenth-century American law 
disfavored absentee owners who left their lands fallow, and often 
transferred title to those who rescued such lands from neglect.405 In 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court stated: “a legislature 
generally has the power to . . . condition [property rights’] continued 
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties.”406 
 
 403. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–63 (1996). 
 404. FAREN R. SIMINOFF, CROSSING THE SOUND: THE RISE OF ATLANTIC AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EASTERN LONG ISLAND 38 (2004); Bethany R. 
Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1112–
13 (2006).  
 405. See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 388, at 1109–14.  
 406. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985). 
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A strict duty to maintain applied to lenders conforms not only to 
these past practices of American property law and to the many 
present ones reviewed in Part II, but also to the duty’s justification 
under two of the three theories of property as developed in this Part 
of the Article. Both utilitarian and relational theories find no 
normative cause to distinguish lenders from owners when enforcing 
duties to maintain vacant lots. 
For utilitarians, the duty to maintain neglected properties in 
foreclosure is a socially desirable mechanism for internalizing 
neighborhood externalities that bargaining cannot handle. As 
detailed in Part II.B, neglected properties carry detrimental effects 
for all nearby property owners.407 They also, as a result, negatively 
impact the lenders who rely on these properties as security for credit 
they issue.408 In accordance, contracts whereby all those who hold 
interests in properties in a neighborhood mutually agree to assure 
minimum maintenance of those properties will benefit all parties. 
Yet, due to the transaction costs reviewed in Part III.B.1, neighbors 
and lenders cannot realistically be expected to enter such contracts 
restricting neglect before it occurs.409 Later, during foreclosure, such 
contracts are blocked by added transaction costs as owners of 
properties in foreclosure are often long-gone, and lenders have no 
reason to announce their identity, which, in the highly segmented 
mortgage market,410 neighbors cannot discern. The unattainable 
maintenance agreement between all owners and all lenders should be 
replaced, according to utilitarianism, with a duty to maintain legally 
imposed on all of them.411 
 
 407. See supra notes 319–26 and accompanying text. 
 408. There are thus grounds to question the First Circuit Court of Appeals’s conclusion that 
lenders are not beneficiaries of a maintenance ordinance whose purpose is neighborhood 
preservation. See Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(holding the “true beneficiaries” of a maintenance ordinance are “mortgagors and the public at 
large”). 
 409. See supra notes 367–70 and accompanying text. 
 410. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11 
(2011) (explaining how mortgages are generally financed through securitization). 
 411. Lenders’ arguments that maintenance duties will render credit more expensive or 
harder to price are unpersuasive. First, the duty’s reciprocal nature will reduce the risk that 
lenders’ securities will lose value due to neighboring properties’ neglect, and the cost of credit 
should adjust downwards accordingly. Second, because ownership always carried the duty to 
maintain, lenders could, and probably did, at least partially already price the duty’s costs when 
setting interest rates. Third, lenders already require owners to carry homeowners insurance, 
which covers many liabilities the duty imposes. 
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This duty is also justified through relational theories. For these 
theories the lender’s duty to maintain is the necessary upshot of the 
special relationship that exists between a lender and the community 
in whose midst the mortgaged property is located. Lenders are more 
powerful than other housing-market participants—the owners to 
whom they lend and their neighbors. Owners and communities 
depend on lenders, who voluntarily involve themselves in the housing 
market to derive benefits from their position. Therefore, as seen in 
Part III.C, and as Congress argued in a similar context, there is a 
relational justification to subject lenders to an obligation to protect 
communities that depend on them.412 
Because of the strong normative justifications for applying the 
duty to maintain in these cases, as well as the history and present 
structure of American law which render the duty inherent to 
property, there is no reason to insist that a maintenance responsibility 
only apply to an interest holder—in this case, a mortgagee—after it 
takes formal title to the land. When assessed as part of the law and 
policy of the duty to maintain exposed in this Article, the expansion 
of lenders’ responsibilities must be judged uncontroversial. 
CONCLUSION 
Edith Beale, known as “Big Edie,” was an early twentieth-
century socialite. She owned Grey Gardens, a big old mansion in a 
tony neighborhood in East Hampton, New York, where she lived 
with her daughter, “Little Edie.” Following the dissolution of her 
marriage, Big Edie did not invest in the grounds’ upkeep. More than 
thirty years of complete neglect left the house decrepit with raccoons 
roaming the halls, garbage mounting throughout, ceilings and walls 
crumbling, and more.413 Consequently, in 1972, the relevant local 
government, Suffolk County, issued an eviction order. While Big Edie 
argued that no one had the right to order her to do anything on her 
land, the county argued that her inactivity as an owner generated 
major costs for her neighbors and for the county. 
 
 412. Similar reasoning led to the adoption of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2901–2907 (2006), which requires banks to “meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered.” The legislators who enacted the Act believed that 
banks were under a duty to reinvest in the communities from which they draw deposits. See 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 
291, 298 (1993) (explaining that “redlining” improperly funnels financial resources out of “areas 
in which the funds are gathered”). 
 413. Gail Sheehy, The Secret of Grey Gardens, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 10, 1972.  
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Luckily, Big Edie was an aunt of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, 
who arranged for the necessary renovations. As a result, the story of 
Grey Gardens ended up playing out as a documentary on movie 
screens,414 as a musical on the Broadway stage,415 and as a movie on 
television sets,416 rather than as a legal dispute in courts. The story’s 
artistic versions celebrated the eccentricities of the two protagonists, 
Big and Little Edie. The legal story, had it unfolded, would have 
exemplified the fact that property law, although aimed at forming for 
individuals a realm of privacy to freely pursue their eccentricities, also 
curbs this freedom of eccentricity. 
An owner is free to pursue her idiosyncratic wishes respecting 
her land, as long as she minimally maintains that land. Property law 
does not force an owner to grow any specific crops on her land; it 
does not force her to use an asset in a specific way. But it also does 
not permit an owner to leave her land fallow; it does not enable her to 
sit back as her asset gathers dust. That legal reality, heretofore 
unacknowledged by scholars, was borne out by the experiences of Big 
Edie in the 1970s and of the Detroit properties put on sale for one 
dollar in the 2010s. Ownership encompasses obligations, including 
affirmative obligations to maintain the land. It always has. It should. 
 
 
 414. GREY GARDENS (Portrait Films 1976).  
 415. GREY GARDENS: THE COMPLETE BOOK AND LYRICS OF THE BROADWAY MUSICAL 
(2007). 
 416. Grey Gardens (HBO television broadcast Apr. 18, 2009).  
